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Why do legislators vote for some defense programs but against others? This
issue is especially important now that Congress faces the need to cut defense
programs while preserving U.S. security. The history of the V-22 offers a prime
case study for examining congressional voting behavior for the post-Cold War era.
This thesis reviews the literature on three possible explanations for
congressional voting behavior: parochialism (the desire to benefit constituents),
the Military-Industrial Complex or MIC (where votes are "bought" by industry
campaign contributions), and the personal preferences of individual members. The
thesis uses logit equations to test and assess the validity of these hypotheses in
the case of the V-22.
No reliable connection was found between personal preference and voting
on the V-22. Liberal Democrats that were assumed to be "dovish" on defense
spending were just as likely as "hawkish" conservative Republicans to support
this program. Nor was any evidence found to support the MIC hypothesis that
voting behavior is driven by PAC dollars. The likelihood of a representative
supporting the V-22 actually decreased as PAC contributions increased. The
parochial hypothesis was supported in the House but not in the Senate. Further
research is required to find alternative explanations for defense voting behavior
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Why do legislators vote for some defense programs but against others? Is
congressional voting behavior driven by the parochial desire to find defense-
related jobs for constituents? Do members vote on the basis of how much money
they get from defense related political action committees (PACs)? Or do members
vote according to their personal beliefs on defense? These issues are especially
important now that the Cold War is over and Congress faces the need to cut
defense programs in a way that best preserves U.S. security. This thesis uses the
V-22 Osprey aircraft to examine what will drive congressional voting behavior in
the post-Cold War era.
This thesis begins by reviewing the literature on three possible explanations
for congressional voting: parochialism (which emphasizes the desire to benefit
constituents), the Military-Industrial Complex or MIC (in which industry
campaign contributions help determine voting behavior), and personal preferences
of individual members of Congress. The thesis then uses logit equations to test
these hypotheses and assess their validity in the case of the V-22 which has been
funded by Congress despite repeated efforts by the Bush Administration to kill
the program.
To test the applicability of the parochial hypothesis, data was gathered on
the location and direct employment totals of V-22 prime contractors and known
ix
V-22 subcontractors. The influence of the MIC was measured in terms of PAC
contributions from the prime contractors: the Boeing Company and Textron
Industries (parent company of Bell Helicopter-Textron). Personal preference was
represented primarily by the member's National Security Index (NSI) score and
secondarily by variables such as a member's former service in the U.S. Marine
Corps or membership in the Tiltrotor Technology Coalition (TTC).
The current political science literature on defense voting stresses the
importance of personal preference and general ideology. However, using standard
indicators for such preferences (especially a member's NSI score), no reliable
connection was found between ideological measures and voting on the V-22.
Liberal Democrats were at least as likely as conservative Republicans to support
this aircraft. Nor was any evidence found to support the MIC hypothesis that
voting behavior is driven by PAC contributions. In fact, House members that
received such contributions from V-22 prime contractor PACs were less likely to
support the aircraft than legislators not receiving such money. The parochial
hypothesis was supported in the House as representatives were more likely to
vote for the V-22 if they believed that the program provided jobs in their districts.
However, no such correlation existed in the Senate. Further work needs to be
done to find alternative explanations for defense voting behavior, particularly
now that the decline of the ex-Soviet threat has eliminated the past ideological
basis for predicting such behavior.
I. INTRODUCTION
"With respect to the V-22, 1 sometimes have the feeling that the last question I will




Secretary Cheney's comment on the fate of the V-22 Osprey program was
prophetic. Yet, in spite of over $2 billion in new appropriations and almost four
years of bitter fighting between Congress and the Executive, the question of "what
about the V-22" remains unanswered. How did the Bush Administration work to
terminate the V-22 in the years following its 1989 program cancellation decision?
How did Congress sustain the Osprey effort in the face of Executive objections?
Most importantly, why did Congress continue to fund a program with an
estimated cost in 1989 of over $23 billion?
The controversy surrounding the V-22 Osprey program offers a classic
example of the struggle between Congress and the Executive to formulate U.S.
defense policy and determine U.S. force structure. The Executive has the
advantage of "firing the first shot" by virtue of its initial budget submission in the
annual authorization and appropriation process. It is from this executive designed
document that Congress makes its modifications to U.S. force structure. Closely
linked to the Executive's "power of proposal" is the large amount of prestige
associated with the Office of the President. Should disagreements over weapons
programs or other areas of defense policy arise, the president can call upon the
vast amount defense expertise within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and
other executive agencies.
Congress relies on its "power of the purse" to shape the armed forces of the
nation. By selectively funding—or not funding—specific programs, Congress can
fashion overall defense policy. Congress also uses the legislative language of the
annual authorization and appropriation bills to further control the activities of the
Department of Defense and pursue of its vision of the force structure required to
meet future threats to U.S. national security. As the case of the V-22 illustrates,
these two visions have become increasingly divergent since the end of the Cold
War. 1
This struggle over the acquisition decision of a single weapon system
between these two branches of government is an important issue in its own right.
From a budgetary standpoint, billions of dollars will be required from an already
strained U.S. treasury should the V-22 enter into the procurement phase. From
a military angle, the V-22 represents what many see as the best solution to the
medium lift deficiency plaguing the U.S. Marine Corps. From an economic and
trade stance, the V-22 could represent a substantial export commodity for the U.S.
aerospace industry.
Yet the V-22 development and procurement issue transcends the narrow
programmatic level and offers a classic example of the struggle between Executive
and Congress over the formulation of U.S. defense policy. It also provides insight
into the tactics and maneuvers employed by each branch of government in the
pursuit of its respective vision of future U.S. force structure and defense policy.
The question of defense policy formulation has been addressed elsewhere and
will not be examined.2 The question at issue here is why did Congress continue
to fund a weapons program that the Bush Administration termed as too
expensive and too narrowly mission focused?3
Most observers of Congress quickly seize on the fact that the V-22
represented defense related work in 47 states and involved over 2000
subcontractors. 4 Did pork-barrel politics rear its ugly head as members sought
to satisfy narrow constituent interests at the expense of national budget priorities?
Did the incessant drive for re-election dominate members' decisions to the point
that the protection of local benefits resulted in the discountenance of a radically
altered international security environment?
Other observers note that the end of the Cold War has exposed the influence
of the Military-Industrial complex as efforts to cut weapons programs, such as the
V-22, are thwarted by Congress. 3 As the defense budget shrinks and defense
contractors are faced with the prospect of fewer "big ticket" items, these
contractors must work harder to maintain their output. Since 1989, the political
action committees of the Boeing Company and Textron Industries
—
parent
companies of two prime contractors Boeing Helicopter and Bell Helicopter,
respectively—have contributed a combined total of $1,285 billion to the electoral
campaigns of congressmen. 6 Did the influence of the Military-Industrial complex,
via (PACs) and industry lobbying efforts, dominate congressional decision-making
on the continuation of the V-22 Osprey?
A few observers have noted that while the first two explanations may be
applicable to individual legislators, neither adequately serves as an explanation
of institutional behavior regarding Congress's role in the weapons acquisition
process.7 The explanation of personal preference contends that members evaluate
a program funding decision from a policy framework. Is it possible that Congress
continued to fund the V-22 because they believed it was a good program that had
not only military value but also possible commercial and civil aviation
applications?
A. PURPOSE
This paper will review the literature concerning congressional decision-
making on defense issues, provide a brief overview of the aircraft's history, and
detail the political environment surrounding the V-22. An examination of the
three competing explanations for congressional behavior in the case of the V-22
will demonstrate that policy concerns of congressional members—not parochial
motivations or the influence of the military-industrial complex—has driven the
continued funding of this program.
B. FINDINGS
An examination of these three major schools of thought, however, did not
fully support the parochial, Military-Industrial Complex, or personal preference
hypotheses. As detailed in Chapter V, support for the parochial hypothesis existed
only in the full House when the nominal level of employment was used in the
multivariate analysis. The presence of a subcontractor was positively related to
support for the V-22 program. The Military-Industrial Complex hypothesis of
votes-for-dollars was found to be significant but inversely related to support for
the V-22 program. The more PAC dollars a member received, the lower the
likelihood of support for the aircraft. The final hypothesis of personal preference
was also significant, but, like the Military-Industrial Complex hypothesis, was
found to be inversely related to support for the V-22. The more pro-defense or
"hawkish" a member was assumed to be, the lower the probability that she or he
would support the continuation of the V-22 Osprey.
C FRAMEWORK
The first section of this paper is devoted to a review of the literature
concerning why members of Congress—both the House and Senate—vote the way
they do with particular attention to voting on defense issues. The second section
will familiarize the reader with the characteristics, developmental reasons, and the
recent legislative history of the V-22 Osprey. The third section describes the
methodology utilized in determining which of the major schools of thought on
congressional voting behavior best explains the behavior on the V-22. The fourth
section is a presentation of the findings and a comparison of how they fit the
competing explanations for congressmen's defense voting behavior. The final
section contains a comparison of the Senate and the House and possible
implications of the findings.
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II. CONGRESS, VOTING, AND DEFENSE
Is it Pork or Policy? This question captures the essence of the debate
surrounding congressional behavior toward defense spending. On one side of the
issue are those that feel that members are driven by parochial interests. This
school of thought believes that congressional micromanagement of the defense
budget down to the programmatic or "line item" level is a result of congressmen
striving to "bring home the federal bacon" or to protect programs already in place.
The overall effect of these specific actions is sacrificed as members seek to satisfy
narrow constituent interests in their quest for re-election.
An offshoot of this school is represented by those who believe that
congressmen are the pawns of special interest groups such as defense-related
political action committees (PACs). They surmise that a member will sell his or
her vote of support (or opposition) on a specific program in return for financial
support of their re-election campaigns.
The other broad school of thought feels that congressmen are driven by their
personal policy preferences when defense spending issues are involved. Since the
majority of defense programs directly involve only one specific congressional
district or state to any large degree, some other factor must determine how a
congressman will vote on the wide range of defense bills and related amendments
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that arise on an annual basis. This hypothesis contends that specific policy
positions taken by members can assist them in their pursuit of re-election.
This chapter will explore each of the three major schools of thought
concerning the explanation of congressional voting behavior on defense issues.
Following a review of the literature for each explanation, the V-22 will be
employed as a test case and the potential applicability of each explanation
discussed. The individual sections will conclude with anticipated relationships
between program support and events such as PAC contributions from the prime
contractors or the presence of a first tier subcontractor for the V-22 in a
representative's district or a senator's state.
A. PAROCHIALISM
Parochialism, better known as pork, is a popular and attractive theory to
explain how congressmen approach defense spending. 1 Conventional wisdom
contends that congressmen are driven by the parochial imperative. Coined by
Gerald Lipson and Randall Fitzgerald, the parochial imperative is defined as an
excessive preoccupation with the local impact of spending decisions at the
expense of the national interest, especially with regard to the two goals of a
balanced federal budget and reduced levels of spending. 2 At the core of the
parochial imperative argument is the assumption that members, especially
military committee members, attempt to direct defense related expenditures to
their district/state to secure re-election by providing defense-related benefits to
their constituencies.3 Exceptional congressmen, such as Rep. Mendel Rivers (D-
S.C.), have come to typify the commonly held view of the parochially motivated
member.4
1. Defense Benefits: Weapons and Jobs
The popular literature is filled with stories of how congress is robbing
the federal treasury to fund weapons programs in their districts or to increase
defense-related jobs in their district or state. 5 Robert Higgs is the harshest critic
of perceived parochially motivated defense spending. 6 Commonly cited examples
of "pork hawk" activity include the continuation of the A-7 Corsair, C-5B Galaxy,
the B-1B Excalibur, and the A-10 Warthog. Others examples are the ill-fated T-46
trainer, the B-2 and the Seawolf SSN programs.7
It would be gullible to assume that no parochial motives underlie the
support for weapons built or to be built in a member's district or state. Indeed,
James Lindsay argues that
...constituencies that host prime contractors usually depend on that weapon
as much as other constituencies depend on [military] bases. Members
representing these constituencies often have little electoral choice but to
support the weapon.8
A possible reason why members fight so hard to save military prime
contracts in their district/state is because their constituents view these
programs—much in the same way bases are viewed—as semipermanent
benefits.9 They fear that their constituents may hold them responsible for the loss
of benefits and probable resultant economic decline. 10
10
It is also a mistake not to recognize that the electoral connection
demands such activity. In fact, Rep. Les Aspin (D-WI) has stated that
...congressmen vote the way they do primarily because of their constituents,
and this is particularly true when it comes to votes pertaining to defense. 11
Position taking can contribute to a member's re-election efforts and it is more
important to be on the right side rather than on the zvinning side. 12 An
examination of these above mentioned programs will find that they were (or are
in the process of being) terminated by Congress because the parochially
motivated arguments of their congressional backers failed to convince a majority
of congressional members that the systems were necessary.
The professional literature finds almost no empirical evidence to
support the parochial imperative—that military committee members enjoy higher
levels of defense benefits than non-committee members—and no clear evidence
to support the hypothesis that members' defense voting is linked to levels of
military spending in their district or state.
Carol Goss concluded that members of the House Armed Services
Committee (HASC) were likely to be linked to extra base employment. 13 R.
Douglas Arnold, however, noted several methodological flaws in Goss's work and
in his own study found no support for the hypothesis that members of military
committees are able to affect employment levels at installations in their
districts.
14 Leonard Ritt found that the "standard model which points to
committee position and/or seniority as the most important independent variables
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in enabling legislators to enrich their districts is not generally accurate." 15 Bruce
Ray has conducted several investigations and has found that military committee
members' districts do not appear to be rewarded for their support of DoD
desires,16 that powerful committee members did not receive favorable treatment
in the federal spending process when compared with constituencies represented
by poorly positioned legislators,17 and that military appropriation committee
members, like their non-committee counterparts in Congress, were unable to
prevent losses of federal activities in their districts. 18 Other studies by Barry
Rundquist found that congressional districts represented on the House military
committees did not benefit disproportionately from the distribution of military
procurement expenditures. 19 A joint study by Rundquist and David Griffith
found that constituents did not benefit from being represented on congressional
military committees.20 One final study by Rundquist and John Ferejohn
concluded that "something about the way military procurement decisions are
reached prevents districts and states represented on military committees from
benefitting."21
All of these studies provide empirical evidence that the parochial
imperative is not a contributing factor in the allocation of defense expenditures.
Additional evidence on why members seek positions on military committees
further discredits the parochial hypothesis. One would expect that desires to
provide constituent benefits would be the overwhelming reason behind efforts to
gain a seat on the military committees. Interview evidence, however, has not
12
borne this out. Charles Bullock interviewed nine freshman representatives in the
92nd Congress (1971-3) and found that five sought sets on the HASC for
constituency reasons and three sought seats on that committee for policy
reasons.
22 Similar work by Steven Smith and Christopher Deering with House
and Senate freshman in the 97th Congress (1981-3) found that of those new
members seeking positions on the HASC, eleven cited constituency reasons while
seven cited policy reasons. For the SASC, constituency and policy reasons were
each mentioned four times.23 Lindsay conducted interviews during the 100th
Congress (1987-9) and found that of the nineteen HASC members interviewed,
thirteen sought seats for reasons of economic well-being while eight sought seats
for policy reasons. 24 While the data collected from these interviews do not
discredit the parochial imperative, they do indicate that there is more than the
desire to bring home the "defense bacon" influencing committee selection for
incoming members.
Another angle to view the influence of parochialism on defense is to
determine the impact of overall defense spending levels on the defense voting
behavior of a congressman. Related to this approach is the utilization of economic
benefits that specific weapons systems provide to states and districts versus the
voting performance of a congressman on that program.
Over a dozen studies have been conducted regarding levels of military
spending and defense voting behavior. While several of these studies show some
correlation between defense spending and voting behavior, they occur only in
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studies involving the Senate and are often weak. No study to date has shown a
correlation between defense spending and voting behavior in both chambers of
Congress.25
While studying the Senate, James Clotfelter found that defense
employment of all kinds was related to roll call behavior.26 Similarly, Bruce
Russett found that economic incentives slightly influenced the position that
senators took on general defense spending.27 Charles Gray and Glenn Gregory
found that military spending had a small but statistically significant relationship
to voting in the Senate.28
In contrast to these works, Frank Wayman found that a Senator's roll
call voting was only weakly associated—not statistically significant—with their
state's economic base.29 Stephen Cobb has conducted several studies in this area.
His findings include that the House of Representatives as a whole provides no
evidence that the amount of defense spending a congressman receives in his
district as opposed to another has any influence on how he votes on selected
foreign policy issues.30 A later study found no significant or consistent pattern
of correlations between defense spending and foreign and defense policy
voting.31 In the same vein another study by Cobb found that defense spending
concentrations had no significant influence on the manner in which senators voted
on issues in the area of foreign policy. 32 Ray found that constituent dependence
upon defense spending is not an adequate predictor of a representative's
predisposition towards national security issues.33 Neil Hieghberger found that
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the impact of direct military presence in a representative's districts was
ambiguous. 34 A final study by Wayne Moyer found that primary contract awards
never showed any significant association with defense voting and that defense
payrolls and military affiliations exhibited only moderate associations with
defense voting behavior.35
Several studies have also been done regarding congressional behavior
when specific weapons programs involve economic benefits for their district or
state. Robert Berstein and William Anthony showed that economic incentives had
no statistically significant effect on Senate voting behavior regarding the ABM
system.36 Richard Fleisher found that economic benefits for the B-l bomber
program were an insufficient predictor for Senate voting behavior.37 Lindsay
concluded that parochialism had little effect on congressional decision making
involving strategic weapons systems.38 A follow-on study by Lindsay involving
the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) found constituency benefits to be statistically
insignificant regarding member voting behavior on the system.39 Work by
Kenneth Mayer on funding for Navy carriers found that while constituent
economic benefits were not the most potent predictor for roll call voting, members
will think about constituent economic level consequences when they decide
whether to support funding for a weapon system. 40
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2. Parochialism and the V-22
How well does the V-22 fit the parochial hypothesis? From an initial
look at the size of the program, it is notable that only three states lack some
portion of the work for the V-22. Thus the V-22 program appears to provide
economic benefits to a substantial number of congressional members. Do senators
and representatives from the remaining forty-seven states support the program
due to the economic benefits that it provides their constituents? Do members of
the congressional committees that have jurisdiction over the V-22 receive more of
the work on the V-22 than other congressional members?
What is unique about the V-22 is that it has the potential for
classification as "national pork." Its potential for easing overcrowding at congested
airports, opening air routes to previously inaccessible parts of the country (e.g.,
Alaska), and for saving billions of matching federal dollars as a result of vertiport
versus airport construction options, takes the V-22 out of the familiar local picture
and places it at the national level. It also has the potential to be a leading export
product from the U.S. commercial aviation industry. Because it represents "dual
use technology" that many other military systems do not possess, the V-22 may
obfuscate the line between pork and policy.
3. Summary and Predictions
The evidence as presented in the literature appears to weigh in against
the theory of the parochial imperative. Yet it could be that the theory is true and
16
that either improper data utilization or faulty methodology has obscured the true
link between the parochial imperative and congressional behavior on defense
issues. 41 How well does the V-22 Osprey fit the theory of the parochial
imperative as an explanation for congressional voting behavior on defense issues?
As noted, the widespread dispersion of V-22 subcontract awards
appears to support the theory of parochialism. Yet this seemingly obvious
explanation may be correct. If this were true, then it is expected that members
with V-22 expenditures in their district or state would vote in favor of sustaining
this program. It is also anticipated that members on the military
committees—who are in the best position to include funding requests for the V-22
in the annual defense authorization and appropriation bills—would have some
portion of V-22 related expenditures in their district or state as a way of
providing economic benefits to their constituents.
B. MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
The warning given by then-President Eisenhower in his 1961 Farewell
Address on the dangers of an emerging alliance between the military and private
industry still rings loud and clear in the ears of many people. The mere mention
of the Military-Industrial Complex conjures up thoughts of a widespread
conspiracy by government, military and industry leaders to divert the national
treasury toward self-serving and unnecessary weapons. Yet the nature of this
interpretation of the Military-Industrial Complex (MIC) is misleading. Indeed,
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scholars have questioned if a MIC has ever truly existed.42 If it does exist, what
comprises the MIC?
1. The MIC Defined
Rep. Aspin defines the MIC as
... one more special interest group seeking special attention from our
government—a contract here, a tax benefit there, a rewriting of the
regulations to make the pursuit of the golden bough easier, cheaper, and, in
the end, more profitable.43
The MIC is differentiated from parochialism by its structure and degree
of organization. The MIC has been described as an iron triangle which consists of
the private defense industry and the military establishment as the two sides
resting on a base formed by Congress.44 This arrangement allows the three
primary players to work "hand-in-glove" with each other to ensure that military
contracts are awarded on a regular basis to defense companies so weapons and
plants can be built in military committee members' districts, thus providing the
military with the latest in weapons technology.45
The MIC is also differentiated from parochialism by the catalyst which
prompts the member to support or oppose a particular program. In the previous
hypothesis (parochialism), the member acted as a result of perceived constituency
pressures. In the MIC hypothesis, the member acts favorably on a program as a
result of political action committee (PAC) contributions. The MIC theory believes
that these PAC contributions "buy" the member's vote.
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Proponents of the MIC theory feel the complex is a self conscious
conspiracy acting mainly in its own interests. The MIC has been responsible for
the falsification of the conflict ideology behind the Cold War and is the primary
fueler of the arms race for its own monetary and power gains.46 Another aspect
of the MIC is that it is detrimental to the U.S. economy as it consumes scarce
resources for unnecessary defense programs.47 There is no shortage of literature
in this area, but most cite The Power Elite by C. Wright Mills as the work which
first focused attention on this emerging force in American foreign policy.48
In contrast to this interpretation of the MIC is the view that the while
the MIC may be an outgrowth of the power elite, it has grown out of the needs
of the nation's foreign policy goals and not the other way around.49 This view
holds that the MIC is an amorphous, loosely structured entity.
The research literature on the MIC is also mixed. There are studies that
support key statements in the theory while others disconfirm propositions in the
theory. There are others that are equivocal in their findings. The best collection
of these studies is Testing the Theory of the Military-Industrial Complex edited by
Steven Rosen.50 In short, the eleven studies found that while both the United
States and the Soviet Union had extensive industrial sectors oriented toward
defense item production, neither economy was dependent on these expenditures
for military orders. In fact, the majority of U.S. corporations derived only a small
part of their sales from military contracts, and the profits involved were not
excessive. The MIC required an external threat to provide strategic rationale for
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military expenditures, and it was found that this threat was not fabricated by the
MIC. The studies also bore out that the weapons acquisition process is affected
by internal politics. 51 The best way to view the MIC was not as a conspiracy but
as a subtle interplay of interests and perceptions. 52
The MIC theory suggests that military committee members would
experience higher levels of defense spending in their districts, but as
demonstrated in the section on parochialism, this is not the case. Mayer has
proven that Congress has very little influence over who receives prime contract
awards due to the structure of the contract awarding process. 53 A member who
does appear to benefit disproportionately in the receipt of military contracts to his
district or state is the beneficiary of geography rather than some reward by the
MIC. Data from FY92 reveals that over 50% of all DoD Military Procurement
awards (prime contracts) were concentrated in only five states. 54
It is estimated that over fifty percent of the value of the prime contract
is distributed to subcontractors. 55 These subcontracts, which are awarded by the
prime contractor(s), are often spread out over a large geographic area with the
intent of giving everyone a piece of the pie. 56 These tactics, however, do not
guarantee support for the program. The studies previously cited involving the B-
1B and the Navy carriers have found that local economic benefit was not the most
potent predictor behind congressional voting on those programs.
Another method to measure the influence of industry over members
of Congress is to compare the amount of PAC contributions to a member and that
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member's voting record on specific programs such as the V-22. Coincident with
PAC contributions are lobbying activities by the major defense contractors. While
most observers assume that there is a firm link between PAC contributions and
congressmens' voting decisions, scholarly research into this area shows this not
to be the case.
Mayer's work involving PAC contributions by defense contractors
found that overall, military committee members received above average
levels—both absolute and percentage wise—of contributions and that PAC
contributions were usually given to members who were viewed as pro-defense. 57
His detailed analysis of the AVCO/M-1 tank engine second source and the
Lockheed C-5B debates indicated that PACs accelerate their contributions when
their sponsored program is in trouble. At the same time, however, he found that
as a general rule, PAC money would not guarantee a recipient's vote. 58 Analysis
of PAC contributions by the Tenneco Corporation in the case of proposed funding
for two additional aircraft carriers found that the PAC contributions "had no
effect on the vote."59
Similar to the findings of Janet Grenzke, Mayer found that defense
PAC contributions, while strategically timed, often appeared to be targeted
counter to the popular money-for-votes theory. If the purpose of defense PAC
contributions is to ensure a majority, then contributions to members already
predisposed to defense spending is not the wisest utilization of PAC financial
resources. In the same vein, Grenzke noted that PACs "tend to give to friends."60
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If PAC money truly bought votes, it would make more sense to give to defense
moderates or to members who are undecided. 61
While PAC contributions may not govern voting decisions, they do
appear to "buy" access to members of Congress. 62 John Wright confirmed this
observation and found that lobbying, not money, shapes and reinforces member's
voting decisions.63 Work by Richard Hall and Frank Wayman also found a
positive relationship between access and PAC contributions. They, like Wright,
concluded that the lobbying activities of "organized moneyed interests" (i.e.,
PACs) affected the decision-making process of Congress.64
Not surprisingly, a majority of major defense contractors have offices
in Washington, D.C. and use lobbyists to try and "sell their goods to the federal
government." Most of their time is spent providing information to executive and
legislative members. 65 The temptation for the military and contractors to work
too closely together has been alleged by one author, but an investigation by the
Justice Department found no evidence of wrongdoing.66 The case of the
lightweight fighter also provides insight into how defense industry lobbyists can
change a member's mind based on the information provided.67
These lobbying activities, however, are not limited to industry
representatives alone. For example, in 1989, Secretary Cheney personally—and
successfully—lobbied members of the House Armed Services Procurement
Subcommittee in an effort to approve his initial procurement proposal which
deleted funding for the V-22 Osprey.68 Additionally, the existence of the "Marine
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Corps" lobby on Capitol Hill is a well known but undocumented fact. According
to interviews with senior Senate staffers, the thinly knit group of Marine Corps
officers and legislators exerts a large amount influence over issues of importance
to the Marine Corps.
On a closing note, it is interesting that in spite of the supposed power
of the MIC, many U.S. defense industries are diversifying. Most influential in their
decision to diversify out of defense production were straightforward business
calculations that showed that defense spending cuts and/or flat defense spending
limited the potential for sales growth in the military field. 69 The survey also
found that several firms criticized the low return on investment in doing business
with the Pentagon and the degree of perceived overregulation as causing
unacceptably high risks for defense firms.70
2. The MIC and the V-22
As previously mentioned, Congress has very little influence over to
whom prime contracts for proposed weapons systems are awarded. Yet the prime
contractors often strategically spread the subcontracts over a wide area in an
attempt to obtain widespread support for their program. It is this conscious action
by the prime contractors that differentiates the resultant economic benefits for a
member's district or state from the parochial imperative.
This certainly appears to be the case with the V-22. The two prime
contractors, Boeing Helicopters and Bell Helicopter-Textron Industries, have 201
first tier subcontractors and over 1800 second and third tier subcontractors located
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in 47 states. Are members sympathetic to the V-22 rewarded by the presence of
a subcontract in their district? Are members who sit on the defense committees
and relevant subcommittees more likely than other member to have a V-22
subcontract in their district or state?
The existence of the Tiltrotor Technology Coalition seems to confirm
the suspicions of most MIC conspiracy theorists. The Tiltrotor Technology
Coalition is comprised of business, labor, and political leaders. Here defense
contractors with a direct stake in the V-22 have joined with members of Congress
to "spread the word" about the defense, commercial, and trade potential of the V-
22. For example, General Motors and its division Allison Motors, which builds the
T406-AD-400 turboshaft engines on the V-22, are in the same group as Sen. Dan
Coats (R-IN) and Sen. Richard Lugar (R-IN) whose state is home to the Allison
plant. Is this organization the visible portion of a V-22 iron triangle with the
"silent" Marine Corps lobby operating in the shadows?
How much "access" did the combined PAC contributions of $1,285
billion since 1989 "buy" the Boeing Company and Textron Industries? Since
detailed data on lobbying activities is not available due its sensitive nature, any
conclusions on the influence of industry or "other" lobbyists would be sheer
speculation. In spite of the findings of several researchers regarding PAC
contributions and voting behavior, did these contributions affect a member's
voting behavior or support for the V-22?
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3. Summary and Predictions
Although there is a relationship between privately owned industry and
government agencies as a customer for defense items, the MIC's influence over
defense weapons acquisition and congressional voting behavior remains unclear.
Does this highly structured yet difficult to identify entity known as the MIC
provide the key to understanding congressional voting behavior on defense issues
such as the V-22?
If the MIC really is as influential as many perceive it to be, then it is
anticipated that members of the military committees in Congress will be more
likely to have V-22 related work in their districts or state as an effort by the MIC
to obtain their support for the V-22 program. It is also expected that members of
the Tiltrotor Technology Coalition—if it a true manifestation of the MIC—will
have more V-22 related work in their state or district than other members of their
respective chambers. It is also anticipated that PAC contributions from the Boeing
Company or Textron Industries will be positively related to recipients' voting
behavior on the V-22.
C PERSONAL PREFERENCE
The final hypothesis behind congressional voting behavior on defense issues
is termed personal preference. This hypothesis for explaining congressional voting
behavior on defense issues contends that members act according to their own
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feelings and beliefs about an issue and the policy they see it as representing. This
concept is also referred to as ideology.
James Lindsay is the leading advocate of ideology as the explanation for
congressional defense voting behavior. He feels that a member's ideology is used
not so much to reach a decision on an issue but rather to justify their positions.71
He uses rating systems such as the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA)
liberal-conservative scale (0-100) or the American Security Council's (ASC)
National Security Index (NSI) scale (0-100). Since ideology is such a broad term,
Lindsay has coined the term "hawkishness" as a substitute when dealing with
Congress and defense issues.72
While Lindsay and others, such as Kenneth Mayer, who believe in the
ideological nature of congressional defense voting behavior have come up with
an effective way to measure ideology—or personal preference—they have not
sufficiently explained what comprises ideology. If ideology is the potent predictor
that many believe it is, it would seem important to understand what comprises
the "fuzzy" concept of ideology or personal preference.
Personal preference is a complex interaction of an individual's images,
attitudes, values, and beliefs involving any policy decision such as funding for
defense programs.73 A member's image of defense issues is comprised of his or
her perceptions, evaluations, and the meaning he or she assigns to an issue. For
example on a program such as the V-22, does the member perceive it as a
necessary system? Does the member evaluate its new technology to be within
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acceptable levels of risk? Does the member see the development of the V-22 as a
signal of U.S. willingness to increase its involvement in crises abroad? The images
created by each individual decision-maker are a critical part of the member's
personal preference make-up.
Attitudes are less complex than image formation. Attitudes can be thought
of as "general evaluative propositions" that members hold about a wide range of
policy areas.74 These propositions may be as simple as "good or bad" or as
complex as "stabilizing or destabilizing." Attitude provides the decision-maker
with a basic framework from which to view and evaluate issues.
Values are essentially a result of upbringing and personal experience. They
serve as standards against which certain actions such as spending billions of
dollars on a new aircraft or spending that money on displaced worker re-training
programs are judged. They also provide the individual with reasons and
justifications for decisions and actions. If the member holds the defense of U.S.
national interests, via military means, very highly, he can turn to his values to
confirm his decision to support the development of new military systems.
The final component of personal preference is beliefs. Beliefs are closely
related to values and can be thought of as "propositions that individuals hold to
be true even if they cannot be verified."75 An explicit set of beliefs is sometimes
referred to as doctrine which is often used to explain reality and prescribe goals
for political action.
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Each of the four components of personal preference—images, attitudes,
values and beliefs—overlap and reinforce each other. This complex, intricate
interaction produces the personal preference make-up of each individual. It is
what some refer to as ideology or "hawkishness" when dealing with defense
issues.
A member's personal preference on an issue is likely to be most active when
it is perceived that the electoral constituency's interest (or issue saliency)—both
present and future—is very low on a particular issue. Research has shown that
perceived constituency opinion is quite important when a congressman is
deciding how to vote.76 If an issue is perceived as salient to the member's
electoral constituency, then the member may submerge his own policy preferences
to those of his constituents.77 This calculation is dependent upon the electoral
ramifications of a possible cross against the member's hometown voters.78
If, however, their own policy views do not contradict those of the
constituents that elected them, or if issue saliency is low, then the member is
"loose in the harness" and free to vote his or her policy views.79 More recent
work by Kenny Whitby and Timothy Bledsoe involving U.S. senators appears to
confirm this observation. They found that the
... electoral fortunes of incumbent senators are, to a modest degree, tied to
their issue discrepancy vis-a-vis their constituents. Senators who deviate
from the ideological leanings of their constituents can expect a more difficult
time at the polls than their colleagues who embody more of a delegate role
and who faithfully reflect the policy wishes of their constituents.80
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Later research by Stephen Shaffer and George Chressanthis concluded that "voters
do not appear to hold their senatorial incumbents strictly accountable for their
actions."81 They later add that "officeholders are well advised to remain close to
the mainstream of their constituents" and be able to "explain their actions in
Washington to the satisfaction of their constituents."82 In the final analysis, voters
do tend to exercise a very loose form of accountability over their elected
representatives.83
Early work by Aage Clausen makes a very convincing argument that
congressmen approach the hundreds of decisions that they are faced with from
a policy perspective. He contends that members organize the numerous diverse
issues into five broad policy dimensions—civil liberties, international involvement,
agricultural assistance, social welfare, and government management—and vote
according to their ozun views u Clausen further argues that because of the ill
definition of the constituents' interests truly are, the effects of constituency
influence is not as restrictive as generally thought. 85
1. Empirical Support for Personal Preference
A study by Douglas Nelson and Eugene Silberberg found that ideology
did not predict how senators voted on specific weapons. Instead they concluded
that parochial interests—local economic benefits—were a better predictor. 86 These
findings are inconsistent with the majority of the scholarly research and have been
criticized on methodological grounds.87
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James Lindsay is the leading advocate of the ideological nature of
members' voting decisions. In his studies involving strategic weapons systems,
he has found that of all the possible explanations for congressional decision-
making on such systems as the Missile Experimental (MX) and the Anti-Satellite
(ASAT) program, the most accurate predictor was the privately held policy views
of the member.88 In his work on SDI, Lindsay found that "members' general
defense views remain significant predictors of how they vote" and that "ideology
or hawkishness best predicts congressional voting."89
Other studies include analysis of the ABM system by Robert Berstein
and William Anthony who found that "the position that a Senator adopted on the
ABM issue has been shown to reflect his ideology, not his party commitment or
the economic benefits his state would derive from the adoption of the ABM."90
Ralph Carter found that ideology had a direct and significant effect on defense
procurement issues.91 Stephen Cobb found that the votes of congressmen can be
explained in appreciable measure by their ideological predispositions as
symbolized by their party affiliations and the regions in which their districts are
located.92 Richard Fleisher in his study of the B-l bomber found that ideology
was an important predictor of roll call voting on the B-l but that its impact was
not constant over time.93 Frank Wayman found in his analysis of arms control
and strategic arms voting in the Senate that "the roll-call voting of senators on
defense, in short, is most strongly associated with their own general voting
tendencies."94
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Kenneth Mayer's study of funding for aircraft carriers indicates that the
importance of ideology is not limited to the strategic or nuclear weapons realm.95
Through detailed examination, he concluded that the "single best predictor of how
a member voted on this issue is his or her expressed preference on defense issues
in general."96
While this list of findings is not all inclusive, it does provide
overwhelming evidence that a member's personal preference on defense issues
is a potent indicator of how she or he will vote. It is also interesting to note that
as circumstances—such as the international security environment or perceived
threats to U.S. national security—change, so does the predictive effectiveness of
ideology. This is due to a change in images generated by new surroundings. This
"ideological shift" or change in a member's personal preference is probably not
quickly manifested via defense voting behavior until some basic attitudes have
been altered to fit the member's new vision of reality.
2. Personal Preference and the V-22
How well does the V-22 fit the personal preference hypothesis of
congressional defense voting behavior? The application of a member's personal
preference requires the construction of a framework from which to view and
evaluate an issue. In the case of the V-22, these frameworks for support of the
multi-billion dollar program take the shape of what many call policy arguments.
How a member perceives an issue and his or her attitude toward the type of issue
at hand will shape the type of policy reasons that emerge to rationalize that
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member's support or opposition to an issue. For the V-22, these main policy
reasons for support of the aircraft are its military value, its civil aviation potential,
and its export potential. While one member may focus more sharply on one of
these three policy arguments, they are usually mentioned simultaneously to
ensure a majority of support for the program. For members opposed to the V-22,
the arguments focus on the high cost of the program.
The military value argument for the V-22 centers around the unique
characteristics of the aircraft such as its speed, range, and advertised survivability
in hostile landing zones. Rep. Tim Burton (D-IN) has stated that "[T]he V-22 will
allow the Marines and our Special Operations Forces to perform over-the-horizon
ship-to-shore assaults quickly and with fewer casualties."97 Sen Lloyd Bentson
(D-TX) noted that the V-22 will provide the flexibility U.S. forces will require in
a world more often turbulent and chaotic than neatly ordered and predictable.98
Sen. John Glenn (D-OH) has referred to the V-22 as "one of the greatest advances
we have for conventional warfare enhancement for all four services."99
Other observers feel that the V-22 Osprey represented one of the first
opportunities for Congress to make a statement—in concrete terms—about the
importance of supporting programs that are relevant to a strategy that accounts
for the current flux in the international climate. 100 Some supporters of the V-22
program point out that the advances in tiltrotor technology will lead to similar
advances in military unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). 101
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Former Marine Corps Commandant General Alfred Grey, USMC (Ret.),
has stated that the V-22 is the most cost-effective idea over time to the U.S.
Marine Corps need to replace its aging CH-46E Sea Knights. 102
The civil aviation argument in favor of the V-22 highlights the aircraft's
potential for reducing congestion along overcrowded air corridors between major
cities.
103 One simulation indicated that through the use of commercial tiltrotor
aircraft, the average flight time along the crowded Northeast corridor was
reduced by over an hour and departures from major airports reduced by one-
third. 104 Another study indicated that vertical flight commuter transportation
systems would result in lower costs, greater convenience, increased quality of
service and possibly enhanced safety for the air transport industry and the
travelling public.105
An indication of the strength of this policy argument can be seen in the
FY93 Transportation Bill. During the conference markup of the FY93
Transportation Bill, Congress appropriated $1.5 million—which was not requested
by the Administration—for research, engineering and development of the
necessary infrastructure required to integrate the V-22 tiltrotor aircraft at civilian
airports.106
Its ability to provide air service to previously isolated areas of the
country—due to either terrain limitations or lack of funds for airport
construction—is also touted as a positive characteristic of the envisioned civilian
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variant of the V-22. Sen. Ted Stevens (R-AK) predicts that when the commercial
variant of the V-22 comes to Alaska it will revolutionize civil aviation. 107
Supporters cite the need to develop the military version of the tiltrotor
aircraft first to prove the safety and reliability of this new technology.108
The export potential argument often cites the fact that our two main
economic competitors, Japan and Europe, are developing tilt-technology aircraft.
The Ishida Aerospace Research Company of Japan has a development facility only
15 miles from the Bell Helicopter plant in Fort Worth, TX. 109 A Japanese
industrialist, Hikaru Matsunaga, commented after touring the Bell Helicopter
facility that "If you produce this aircraft, I guarantee you we will buy it. If you
do not, I guarantee you we will build it."110
The European consortium, EUROFAR, is also experimenting with tiltrotor
designs. Its version of a tiltrotor aircraft would carry thirty passengers and begin
flight testing by 2000 with initial production targeted for 2010. 111
Estimates of the size of the potential export market range from 3000 to
5000 aircraft by 2010. 112 Many members of Congress warn of a repeat of the
VCR fiasco and feel that if the V-22 is not produced, U.S. commercial aviation
firms will have to buy U.S. developed technology from overseas manufacturers.
3. Summary and Predictions
How a member views an issue appears to be a powerful indicator of
how he or she will vote. Given the cost and technology demonstration factors that
must be met prior to the development of a commercial variant of the V-22, a
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military version is the first step toward the development of an export market for
U.S. built tiltrotor aircraft. Thus member's personal preferences on defense issues
should be the best predictor of a member's support or opposition to the V-22.
Since no better measurement of a member's personal preference or ideology is
available, the ADA and NSI scales will be used to represent this concept.
However, the effectiveness of these rating systems as an accurate
measure of ideology has been questioned by some in the post-Cold War era. With
regard to the ADA scale, Paul Stockton notes that such "conservatives" as Rep.
John Kasich (R-OH), who had a 1990 ADA rating of 11 and an NSI rating of 100,
helped to lead the fight in the House against B-2 bomber funding. 113 Stockton
further argues that the
... rise of concerns over the deficit and collapse of the Soviet threat are
scrambling the ideological basis for predicting and assessing legislators'
votes.
114
Interviews with senior Senate staffers indicated that rating systems
such as the NSI scale for defense issues may not be truly representative of how
the member views the overwhelming majority of the defense budget. The selected
votes used by the ASC are usually very controversial in nature (e.g., funding for
the B-2 or the Strategic Defense Initiative) and represent only a small fraction
(perhaps 2-3%) of the total defense budget. Issues that comprise the "guns and
bullets" portion of the defense budget are rarely decided via a roll call vote. This
activity may actually mask how a member feels about overall defense spending.
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How well do the ADA and NSI rating systems predict voting behavior
on a $28 billion weapon system that was scheduled to enter advanced
procurement in the wake of the collapse of the then-Soviet Union? If these ratings
are consistent, they should be potent predictors if a member supported the V-22
for ideological reasons.
It is anticipated that members that are pro-defense or hawkish (i.e., a
high NSI rating) will support the V-22.
D. OVERVIEW
Present in all of these hypotheses
—
parochialism, MIC, and personal
preference—is the goal of re-election. 115 The parochial hypothesis holds that
members fear the wrath of their constituents should they vote against a defense
program that may provide economic benefits to their district or state. Thus
members vote to support programs that provide economic benefits to their
constituents. The MIC hypothesis contends that members support programs due
to PAC contributions by the respective defense contractors. The personal
preference hypothesis states that members vote according to their own personal
beliefs and views regardless of any local economic benefits (with the exception of
those districts hosting prime contractors) or PAC contributions.
The deferential hypothesis is not considered as recent events such as the
force structure proposals put forth by Rep. Les Aspin (D-WI) only further
reinforce earlier studies that found the familiar model of "the Executive proposes
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while the Congress disposes" to be outdated. 116 While the possibility of
logrolling—the exchange of voting support on different bills by different members
of Congress which—exists, it will not be considered here due to its "transparency"
and "indetectability."117 The practice of cue-following—searching for trusted
colleagues to provide cues as to which way the member should vote on issues
about which he or she is uninformed or unsure—may also be present but, like
logrolling, its "indetectability" makes its consideration an impossibility. 118
With a better understanding of these competing explanations of
congressional defense voting behavior, the next chapter describes the V-22
program origin and the bitter struggle that ensued following the program
cancellation in 1989.
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Ill: V-22 PROGRAM HISTORY AND BUDGETARY ENVIRONMENT
A. V-22 PROGRAM OVERVIEW1
The V-22 is the latest iteration of tiltrotor technology that was first
developed in the 1950s. 2 It is a hybrid aircraft that can take off like a helicopter
and, by rotating its outboard nacelles (engine and propeller assembly), transition
to forward flight similar to a fixed-wing turbo-prop aircraft. It incorporates
advanced composite materials and is built under a fixed price contract by the joint
team of Bell Helicopter Textron and Boeing Helicopter (hereafter referred to as
Bell-Boeing) and involves numerous sub-contractors. 3 As a result of the
withdrawal by the U.S. Army in 1983, the U.S. Navy is the current program
manager. 4 As of 20 July 1992, V-22 test aircraft have logged 763 hours during 635
flights. The program was in Full Scale Development (FSD) testing and 80% of the
evaluation had been completed. 3
Due to a re-evaluation of the mission requirements for the medium lift
replacement aircraft, a derivative version of the baseline V-22 is currently under
Engineering and Manufacturing development by the Bell-Boeing Tiltrotor Team. 6
The $550 million development contract award, which could be worth $2.4 billion
through 1998, was announced by the Pentagon on 22 October 1992. 7 The Bell-
Boeing team will build four new production representative aircraft and utilize two
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full scale development models of the V-22 (numbers 2 and 3) to complete
development evaluations. 8
In an effort to reduce the cost and weight of the new derivative version of
the V-22, Bell-Boeing will perform affordability and producibility trade studies.
These studies will result in at least a 20% reduction in production recurring
costs.
9 These studies will be used to develop the most effective configuration for
the tiltrotor derivative prior to the production of the first two new units. Initial
Operational Capability (IOC) for the Marine Corps is planned for FY 1998 and
unit costs for the derivative version of the V-22 could range from $22.5 to $15.6
million dependent upon which trade-offs are adopted by the Navy. 10
Also included in the proposal by Bell-Boeing is a tie-in to low rate initial
production of the aircraft (1 unit/month). Another proposal put forth by Bell-
Boeing is the development and evaluation of the derivative V-22 for utilization
in special operations and combat search and rescue. These evaluations would be
conducted utilizing aircraft numbers two and eight. This action would allow the
preservation of the multimission capabilities of the V-22 thus making it available
to other government and military services and possibly further lowering unit
costs due to increased production. 11
1. V-22 Program Origins
The development of the V-22 is the result of what was once a multi-
service requirement to conduct combat missions using vertical /short take-off and
landing (V/STOL) capabilities not currently available. 12 The program grew out
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of a decision by Department of Defense officials that the requirements pending
from the services for new vertical lift aircraft might be met by a single
multimission aircraft. Thus the Marine Corps' HXM program, which was to
develop an advanced vertical lift assault transport, was transformed into the Joint
Services Vertical Lift Aircraft (JVX) program. 13
The earlier HXM development program was primarily driven by the
Marine Corps' desire to replace their aging and finite fleet of CH-46Es Sea Knight
helicopters which entered service almost thirty years ago. 14 To fulfill its new
doctrine of maneuver warfare and over-the-horizon (OTH) amphibious assault,
the Marine Corps has undertaken a massive modernization program to ensure
effective operations into the next century. 13 The V-22 was designed to meet the
requirements of increased speed, range, lift, and survivability that OTH
amphibious assaults in hostile environments may require.
The Army also foresaw a need for an aircraft with the speed and range
capabilities not found in its helicopter inventory in the 1980s. In addition to
utilizing the JVX aircraft (that evolved into the V-22) for combat support and
medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), the Army also hoped to develop an electronic
warfare variant of the tiltrotor aircraft. 16 Prior to its withdrawal from the
program in 1983, the Army was the executive service for the JVX and had a
projected requirement of 231 units. 17
The Navy and Air Force had a smaller requirement for an aircraft such
as the JVX. The Navy intended to utilize the new aircraft for strike rescue (or
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combat search and rescue) and as a possible anti-submarine warfare platform. Its
initial requirement was for 50 aircraft. The Air Force planned to use the JVX
aircraft in support of long range special operations. It had an initial requirement
of 200 units.18
The Army withdrawal as executive service for the JVX program in 1983
was the result of declining resources. 19 Faced with a trade-off between funding
for their Light Helicopter Experiment (LHX) and the JVX multiservice aircraft, the
Army chose to make the LHX their number one aviation development program.
This action eliminated the need for 231 aircraft and increased the unit cost.20
The Army also felt that since the replacement of the CH-46E was a
high priority within the Marines Corps, they would be able to reenter the tiltrotor
porgram at a future date and ultimately obtain both aircraft. In spite of officially
withdrawing in 1988 for "budgetary" reasons, industry executive, Greg McAdams
of Boeing Helicopters, notes that the Army still has a documented requirement
for the V-22 MEDEVAC, SOF, and combat support.
The V-22 was in danger of becoming a single service program. Actions
by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) in late July 1992 revised the
mission requirements for the aircraft filling the role of medium lift, amphibious
assault.21 The "revised V-22" must now only meet the U.S. Marine Corps'
requirements for conducting combat amphibious assault. The JROC has not
dropped plans to use the aircraft for Air Force long-range special operations and
Navy combat search and rescue missions and the Joint Services Operational
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Requirement (JSOR) remains a valid document. 22 Among the major changes are
the reductions in troop capacity from 24 to 18, aircraft speed requirement from
300 knots (kts) to 180 kts.23 These revised requirements now open the
competition for a medium lift replacement to lower cost helicopters such as
Sikorsky's S-92.24
R. POLITICS OF THE V-22
The events over the past few years involving the V-22 provide an insight
into the moves and countermoves by each interested party in the pursuit of their
goal. The major players are the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the
Congress, and the Bell-Boeing V-22 development team. To a lesser extent, the
Marine Corps had some impact on the debate surrounding the V-22 but
hierarchical obligations prevented them from openly advocating the program.
Key personalities within OSD included the Secretary of Defense Richard B.
Cheney, Acting Secretary of the Navy (then-DoD Comptroller) Sean O'Keefe,
Donald Yockey, Under Secretary for Acquisition, and Dr. David Chu, head of the
Office of Programs Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E). These key members of OSD
opposed the V-22 based on its high cost and perceived narrow mission focus.
Within Congress, the House usually took the lead on efforts to continue the
V-22. Key members of the House included Rep. Curt Weldon (R-PA) whose
district includes Ridley Park which is the home of Boeing Helicopters, and Rep.
Peter Geren (D-TX) whose Fort Worth district is home to Bell Helicopter-Textron
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Incorporated (BHTI). Other House members included Rep. Dick Murtha (D-PA)
and Rep. J. McDade (R-PA) who are respectively the chairman and ranking
minority member on the House Appropriations Defense subcommittee. The key
members in the Senate were Sen. John Glenn (D-OH), Sen. Ted Stevens (R-AK)
and Sen Aden Specter (R-PA). These senators were usually out in front leading
the fight to save the V-22.
The Bell-Boeing team acts together to further educate members of Congress
about the attributes of the V-22. Conversations with knowledgeable personnel
from both Textron Industries and Boeing indicated that their political lobbyists
functioned as "information brokers" for the V-22 program. As noted in the
preceding chapter, the donations from the respective political action committees
(PACs) afford access to the member but the information provided has the greatest
impact on a member.
As previously mentioned, the Marine Corps is somewhat handcuffed in their
support for the program. The public chastisement of the Chief of Staff of the Air
Force, General Larry Welch, by Secretary Cheney on 24 March 1989 after only
eight days in office sent a message to the uniformed military as to who was in
charge.23 The subsequent firing of the following Chief of Staff of the Air Force,
General Michael Dugan, during Operation DESERT SHIELD made the message
crystal clear as to the fate that awaited uniformed military officers that did not
follow the "party line."26 It is common knowledge that Congress has had a long
"love affair" with the Marine Corps and that a "Marine Corps lobby" exists on
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Capital Hill. As confirmed by a senior Senate staffer, however, this lobby is highly
amorphous and any liaisons between members and Marine Corps personnel occur
in "backrooms and hallways" with "no evidence left behind." Any response to
questions regarding the V-22 are usually framed within the need to solve their
medium lift deficiency.lt is from the perspective of these actors that the events
revolving around the V-22 will be detailed.
1. 1982-1988: A Kinder, Gentler Budget Environment
The 1980s provided a nurturing environment for the development of
the V-22 from its XV-15 predecessor. In the early 1980s, the program was not as
fully funded as the Executive branch would have desired. Once the technology
was determined to be with acceptable risk levels, the program received strong
support from Congress. Table 3.1 provides the budgetary history through FY 1989
regarding the V-22.
The Army withdrawal in 1988, reduction in the quantities of required
aircraft by both the Air Force and Navy, and a shift in procurement
strategies—Cost Plus to a Fixed Price contract—had pushed the total cost of the
V-22 program to $25.9 billion for 663 aircraft in 1988. As a result of technical
problems, the program was approximately nine months behind schedule.27
Included in the FY89 Authorization and Appropriations bills were funds for the
procurement of long lead items for twelve production-like aircraft.28
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TABLE 3.1: V-22 BUDGETARY HISTORY: FY83-89



















60 5 5 35 5 37
1984 104 85 53 43 89 89 89
1985 200 179 199 189 189 189 189
1986 609 554 584 584 570 584 582
1987 402 427 387 387 380 431 426
1988 470 480 480 488 470 470 502
1989 641 641 641 641 646 641 667
2. 1989: Opening Shots and Unexpected Saviors
The 14 April budget agreement between President Bush and
Congressional leaders stipulated that the executive had to cut $9.7 billion from its
$305.6 billion FY90 defense budget submission. Newly appointed Secretary
Cheney proposed accomplishing the savings by terminating several major
programs. Cancellation of the V-22 would produce $1.6 in immediate savings and
$7.0 in the "out years."29 On 25 April Secretary Cheney announced the
termination of the V-22 program while testifying before the House Armed
Services Committee on the revised FY90 defense budget. He cited the price tag
of $23 billion for 552 Ospreys as too expensive and too narrowly mission
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focused.30 The PA&E division of OSD was influential in convincing the Secretary
to cancel the V-22 in favor of a mix of H-60s and H-53s to fulfill the medium lift
mission at a less expensive and more cost effective level.31 In an effort to start
building this medium lift replacement mixture, DoD revised its FY90 budget
submission for CH-53Es from 3 to 23 helicopters requiring an additional $349
million. 32
Prior to Secretary Cheney's announcement of termination of the V-22
program, the Senate adopted a non-binding resolution on 22 April urging the
President to restore full funding to the V-22. 33 The real action would come in the
House which traditionally acts on its version of the Defense Authorization Bill
before the Senate.
It was at the sub-committee level that the V-22 almost became extinct.
The first action transpired in the House Armed Services Procurement
subcommittee. The Procurement subcommittee is chaired by Rep. Les Aspin (D-
WI) who also happens to chair the full House Armed services Committee (HASC).
In an attempt to keep the Bush administration's first defense budget from being
stuffed with "filler," Rep. Aspin joined forces with the Pentagon in what one
writer referred to as "pork barrel deterrence."34 He sent a clear message to the
subcommittee members that "There was no room even for the deserving add-ons,
let alone the ones that go oink."35 On 20 June, Rep Aspin made good on his
promise to "vote up or down on taking the procurement section of Secretary
Cheney's request as is, with no add-ons."36 He led a predominately Republican
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coalition (3D - 7R) over most Democrats (8D - 1R) on the Procurement
subcommittee to endorse without change the weapons procurement section of the
revised FY90 defense budget.37
The House Armed Services Research and Development subcommittee
kept the V-22 alive by shifting $300 million from the B-2 development account
and $51 million from the CH-53E account that Secretary Cheney had planned to
use as a replacement for the Osprey. In subcommittee, Rep. Weldon led the fight
for the V-22 and funding was restored due to an agreement that when the full
committee met, members would be willing to restore the $300 million to the B-2
development account provided the same amount was transferred to the Osprey
account from the B-2 production account. 38
When the HASC met on 27 June, a spirited two day debate ensued
over procedural efforts to keep the administration's procurement budget intact
and attempts to resurrect programs that Secretary Cheney had eliminated to
control Pentagon spending. 39 Rep. Marvin Leath (D-TX) offered an amendment
that would have provided, among other items, $351 million in development funds
and $157 million in long lead procurement funds to the V-22 but it was defeated
31-21.40 A joint amendment offered by Reps. Weldon and Sisisky (D-VA) that
provided $230 million for F-14D procurement and $157 million for V-22
procurement was adopted 28-15. The bill payer for the Osprey procurement
funding was about half of the administration requested CH-53Es ($157 million). 41
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The moment of truth for the V-22 program came when HASC
Chairman Aspin reserved the right to offer the revised Cheney procurement
budget request as he had done previously on his Procurement subcommittee.
Reps. Ron Dellums (D-CA) and Patricia Schroeder (D-CO) temporarily held off
voting until the end of the count and then delivered the final two negative votes
that tied the count (9D, 17R - 22D, 4R) and defeated the Cheney package.42
Reps. Dellums and Schroeder are liberal democrats that are not usually
supportive of defense expenditures. Their "support" for the V-22 and F-14D
procurement funding came more from their opposition to the B-2 and does not
represent a genuine endorsement of either program.43 Yet, they became the
unexpected saviors of the V-22. When the meeting finally adjourned, the V-22 had
funding levels of $351 million for development and $157 million for
procurement.44
Activity in the House Appropriations Defense subcommittee—chairman
Rep. Murtha and ranking minority member Rep. McDade, both from
Pennsylvania—echoed the proposed funding levels as contained in the House
FY90 Defense Authorization bill. 45 Actions by the full committee resulted in no
changes to the subcommittee proposed V-22 funding levels.
The Senate was much closer to Secretary Cheney's defense budget
request for FY90. The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) authorized no
funding for V-22 procurement but did provide $255 million for continued
development and test completion.46 The SASC wanted to ensure that the V-22
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flight test program was completed in case the program could "drum-up" other
customers in the Pentagon or in the private sector. This could lead to increased
quantities for purchase that would drive down the unit cost possibly to the point
of affordability by the Marine Corps. The SASC approved the request for 23 CH-
53Es for use as the Osprey replacement.47
The Senate Appropriations Defense subcommittee provided a moment
of excitement when it obligated zero funding for the V-22. Sen. Arlen Specter (R-
PA) led the fight to save the V-22 and other defense projects in Pennsylvania. His
performance earned him praise from subcommittee Chairman Sen. Daniel Inouye
(D-HI) who told Sen. Specter "You've done exceedingly well ... Your constituents
should be very happy."48 Only after Sen. Specter and other members were
assured that programs in their state that were omitted from the subcommittee's
recommendations would be accepted in conference with the House did the
measure move forward to the full committee.49
Funding was restored to the V-22 sooner than Sen. Inouye had
predicted as the Senate Appropriations Committee met on 14 September and
appropriated $255 million for the continued development. The committee also
rejected the administration's request for 23 CH-53Es and funded only 3 of these
aircraft ($62 million). 50
Only during debate in the House on the FY90 Defense Authorization
Bill was the V-22 challenged. Rep. Bill Dickinson (R-AL) attempted to go after the
V-22 and F-14D separately and remove them from the bill. The House Democratic
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leadership, however, rejected this overture and forced a vote on a single
amendment to strike funding for the V-22 and F-14D. The coalition held and the
amendment was defeated 143-278. 51
Activity on the part of the prime contractors and the Marine Corps
during the FY90 budget cycle was limited. When the decision to cancel the V-22
was first suggested, Marine Corps and other service officials lobbied hard on
behalf for the V-22. The Marine Corps suggested other programmatic offsets such
as the M-l tank to fund continued development of the V-22. Bell-Boeing offered
to re-structure the program, thus reducing up-front costs. These efforts, however,
failed to reverse the V-22 cancellation decision. 52
In retrospect, 1989 was the "acid test' for the V-22. The FY90 defense
budget cycle was the last time the V-22 faced extinction due to Congressional
activity. The next three years would be characterized by continued Congressional
authorizations and appropriations countered by OSD efforts to not spend the
allocated funds in pursuit of their quest to terminate the Osprey program. Each
chambers authorization and appropriation levels for the V-22 covering FY90-93
are provided in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 respectively. All funding is for Research and
Development (R&D). Although some funding was authorized and appropriated
for long lead procurement ($157 million in FY90 and $365 million in FY91), these
funds are classified as R&D since the advanced procurement was for production
representative aircraft.
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TABLE 3.2: V-22 AUTHORIZATION SUMMARY: FY90-93














Prev S Ttl S New
S
Prev S Ttl S
1990 508 508 255 255 255 255
1991 403 200 603 38 200 238 403 200 603
1992 625 365 990 365 365 625 365 990
1993 755 790 1545 755 790 1545 755 790 1545
Source: FY90, 91, 92, and FY93 Defense Authorization and Appropriations Bills.
TABLE 3.3: V-22 APPROPRIATION SUMMARY: FY90-93





House Senate Approp. in Conf.
New
S
Prev. S Total S New
S
Prev. S Total S New
S
Prev. S Ttl S
1990 508 508 255 255 255 255
1991 403 200 603 38 200 238 418 200 618'
1992 625 365 990 165 165 625 165 790
1993 755 755 755 755
1 $15 million for procurement of SOF V-22.
Source: FY90, 91, 92, and FY93 Defense Authorization and Appropriations Bills.
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3. 1990: We Ain't Going to Spend the Money
As anticipated, the Administration's FY91 defense budget submission
contained no funding for the V-22. What it did contain was a proposal to take
$1.4 billion from Congressionally appropriated FY90 funds and spend them on
FY91 programs that the Administration considered more important. The proposal
also included $835 million in deferrals of which $200 million had been allocated
for the V-22. Then-DoD Comptroller Sean O'Keefe summed up the
Administration's position when he said "We ain't going to spend the money [for
the purposes Congress intended]." 53 The Administration was standing firm in its
decision to cancel the V-22 and included the program on its "weapons hit list." 54
Any attempt by the executive branch to encroach upon Congress's
power of the purse is met with stiff opposition. This case was no exception. Both
a General Accounting Office (GAO) review and a ruling by the Comptroller
General of the United States found the deferral involving the $200 million in V-22
funds to be unauthorized. 55 To ensure that the funds were spent as Congress
desired, language was inserted into the FY91 Dire Emergency Spending Bill.'6
The funds were eventually released and utilized to contract for production
improvements to the V-22 engine and transmission. 57
As shown by Tables 3.2 and 3.3, the V-22 received increased funding
during this defense budget cycle. Chairman Aspin did not oppose the V-22 and
included it in his subcommittee and committee authorization recommendations
to the House. 58 Also of note is that the House dominated the Senate during
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conferences with regard to V-22 funding levels and funding utilization. This
activity is explained by the use of the V-22 program as a bargaining chip by the
Senate in order to obtain concessions from the House on B-2 and Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI) funding levels. 59
The year 1990 could also be called the Year of the Study. Much of the
controversy over the true cost effectiveness of the V-22 program versus the
Administration's proposed mixture of H60s/H-53s centered around a Cost and
Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) conducted by the Institute for Defense
Analysis (IDA). 60 The study was directed by Congress as part of the FY90
Defense Authorization bill, however, the Pentagon was the contracting agent. As
such, it retained a significant amount of control over what information contained
in the study would be released. 61
In addition to its unsuccessful deferral of appropriated funds, OSD
pursued a two-pronged strategy to terminate the V-22. The first prong was
characterized by the information control. OSD failed to submit several reports as
required by the FY90 Defense Authorization bill. 62 The failure to comply was
cited by the SASC as its reason for not providing any procurement funding to the
V-22 (see Table 3.2).63 OSD also withheld release of the V-22 COEA study done
by IDA despite numerous requests by members of Congress to obtain the
report. 64 When the COEA was finally released, Dr. David Chu testified to the
Senate Defense Appropriations subcommittee that the key assumptions of the IDA
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study were flawed and that the V-22 program was simply unaffordable regardless
of the COEA conclusions. 65
The second prong of the strategy was to begin obtaining the CH-53Es
that were required by the PA&E mix regarding the fulfillment of the medium lift
mission. Accordingly, the Administration requested $377 million for the
procurement of 23 CH-53Es in FY91 and $58 million for advance procurement of
CH-53Es in FY92.
Congress continued to fund the V-22 as shown by Tables 2 and 3. It
also utilized its power of the purse to thwart Executive attempts to build-up the
CH-53E fleet. The FY91 Defense Authorization Bill provided zero funding for CH-
53ES.66 The FY91 Defense Appropriations Bill provided $315 million for twelve
MH-53Es.67 To further aggravate OSD efforts, the twelve MH-53Es were
designated for use by the Naval Reserve.68
Advocates for the V-22 in the Congress cited the IDA study as proof
positive that the Osprey was the best option to the medium lift and amphibious
assault needs of the Marine Corps and other participating services. 69 Supporters
also cited a GAO study that stated "... helicopters proved to be highly
vulnerable... to unsophisticated gun systems" as further evidence that the V-22
was the best choice for amphibious assault because of its enhanced
survivability.70 Opponents of the program echoed OSD criticisms of the COEA
and used a study by the GAO to strengthen opposition to the aircraft. The GAO
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study characterized the V-22 program as "high risk."71 The V-22 opponents,
however, failed to change a sufficient majority of their colleagues' minds.
Bell-Boeing also contributed to the flood of studies surrounding the
cost effectiveness of the V-22. It released its first study in April. The study was
conducted by BDM International and found that it proved dramatically more
survivable and effective than the alternatives available to perform the Marine
Corps' amphibious assault mission.72 A second study, released in September,
was conducted by the Department of Energy's Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory and concluded that a fleet of tiltrotor aircraft would outperform
helicopters in offshore reinforcement of a Marine Corps unit under attack. 73
Other activities by the two prime contractors included landing an XV-15 at the
nation's capitol in celebration of "Tiltrotor Appreciation Day" in April, publicizing
the plight of the Osprey, and refuting OSD claims that the Osprey test program
was way behind schedule.74
The Marine Corps was very vocal compared to the previous year. It is
possible that intensified stand-off between the Executive and Congress forced the
Marine Corps to make their position on the V-22 program clear. The Marine Corps
official in charge of the V-22 program stated he was confident that Congress
would restore funding to the program and that the V-22 was the only aircraft that
can meet the Marine Corps requirements for amphibious assault.75 Additional
Marine Corps support for the embattled V-22 came from its Commandant,
General Alfred Gray who noted that the V-22 was the best choice for the Marine's
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amphibious assault mission.76 Lieutenant General Charles Pitman, Marine
Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation, offered support for the program by delivering
a warning to the Senate Appropriations Defense subcommittee that it was likely
that OSD would seek to reconfigure the results of the IDA COEA in order to
validate its previous termination of the program.77
The Marine Corps also criticized the alternative mix of helicopters
proposed by OSD. The problem of survivability during an opposed assault
remained and could not be solved with current helicopters.78 The composition
of the CH-53/H-60 mix was also criticized for the troop carrying capacity of each
aircraft. The CH-53 was seen as too large and the CH-60 as too small.79
4. 1991: If at First You Don't Succeed...
The FY92 Defense budget submission by the Bush Administration
contained no funding for the V-22. As in the previous year, it included a proposal
to rescind $200 million from FY91 appropriated funds earmarked for V-22
procurement and transfer that money into the research and development account
to complete flight testing of the Osprey.80 Also requested was $509 million for
the procurement of 20 CH-53Es. 81 A request was also made for funding the
Medium Lift Replacement (MLR) aircraft.82 A rumored reevaluation of the
Marine Corps requirements for a medium lift failed to appear as did a possible
accommodation on the V-22 by OSD.83
The purpose of the proposed rescission was to keep the V-22 from
entering production. The desire by Congress in 1990 to make sure the aircraft had
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completed its testing prior to entering procurement will allow DoD to ensure that
the aircraft does not enter into production until at least 1994 at the earliest. The
delay serves to increase the cost of the V-22 program and will make it harder to
fund as the defense budget decreases. 84 A GAO investigation found the
rescission by DoD was valid. 85
Since the GAO had upheld the rescission, Congress needed to pass
legislation if the $200 million in previously appropriated funds were to spent on
the V-22. The vehicle used was the FY91 Dire Emergency Spending bill. It
restored the funds to the V-22 and required that they be obligated within 60
days.86 What it failed to do was direct how those funds were to utilized.87
As in previous years, Congress funded the V-22 while cutting the
requested funding for CH-53E helicopters and proposed funding for the MLR
study. Efforts by V-22 supporters to employ the aircraft for combat search and
rescue during the Gulf war did not succeed. 88
The Bell-Boeing team started the year on a high note as the V-22 had
completed shipboard testing on the USS Wasp in mid-December 1990 with no
setbacks.89 In an effort to further solidify support for the V-22, the prime
contractors, along with NASA and the FAA, called for a government-industry
partnership to bring a broad civil tiltrotor program to fruition by the end of the
century.90
The crash of test aircraft number five on 11 June forced the contractors
to keep a "low-profile."91 The cause was traced to a pin reversal—not a design
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flaw—on two of the three flight control vyros.92 While the crash was a setback,
neither pilot was injured and the aircraft's crashworthiness features were
successfully proven. Testing resumed on 10 September of 1991 and the V-22
received funding for FY92.93 To help solve the weight problem and lower the
cost, Bell-Boeing announced the development of a new method to mate the wings
to the fuselage of the aircraft.94
Activity by the Marine Corps was not as intense as the previous year
and indicated the dissolution with the medium lift problem. General Gray,
however, continued to support the aircraft. In testimony before the HASC, he
commented "I will not stand by and watch Marines go with second best
helicopters."95 It is notable that these comments were made in a for-the-record
submission to the House Armed Services Seapower and Strategic and Critical
Materials subcommittee by Gen. Gray in April 1990. These strong words of
support were only made public in March of 1991 toward the end of Gen. Gray's
tour as Commandant of the Marine Corps.96 This action lends some credence to
the hierarchical restraints placed on uniformed military supporters of the V-22.
Mixed signals were received from the Navy. Vice Admiral Richard
Dunleavy stated that the V-22 was too costly to buy.97 Naval Air Systems
Command, however, reported to then-Secretary of the Navy Garrett that the V-22
was the best solution for the Marine Corps medium lift requirement.98 The
Marine Corps watched as their medium lift problem went unsolved for another
year.
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5. 1992: Changing the Rules
The FY93 Defense Budget submission followed the same pattern as the
previous years. While the possibility for a rescission of the $790 million from FY92
V-22 appropriations existed, a formal proposal was never sent to Congress."
Instead, OSD held off on responding to Congressional requirements for a plan to
build three production like V-22s. It claimed that engineering impossibilities
precluded use of funds as required by Congress as it was too far into the current
fiscal year to correct them. 100
Tensions between OSD and Congress mounted over the non-
expenditure of the FY92 funds. A decision by the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council (JROC) to eliminate the Air Force special operations and Navy combat
search and rescue requirements placed the V-22 program in danger of being
eliminated for lack of a mission. 101 The parameters for speed, range, and troop
capacity were reduced to concur with the amphibious assault requirements of the
Marines. This action allowed a number of less expensive helicopter models to
enter the competition against the high cost V-22. 102
Congress viewed early OSD actions as thinly veiled efforts to further
stall the production of the V-22. By April the funds remained unspent which
prompted the Speaker of the House to inquire why the V-22 funds had not been
used as intended by Congress. 103 The battle between the Congress and OSD
over the V-22 quickly turned "nasty." The HASC bill contained a measure that
would reduce the OSD Comptroller's staff by five percent every month the V-22
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funds remained unspent. 104 It also denied funding for modifications to the
Executive fleet of VH-3D helicopters as well funds for CH-53 procurement and
CH-46 modifications (except those related to safety). 105
The Bell-Boeing team proposed a plan that would keep the remaining
V-22 developmental tests within the $790 million provided by Congress in FY92
by utilizing only two new aircraft. 106 In June the prime contractors offered a
revised testing schedule for the V-22 that would save $75 million by eliminating
some of the flight demonstrations.107
The U.S. Comptroller General found the nonexpenditure of the
previously appropriated V-22 funds by OSD to be illegal. This unfavorable ruling
forced Secretary Cheney to offer a compromise to the stand-off on 2 July 1992. 108
The compromise offered to use the FY92 funds to complete V-22 testing and the
remainder for development of the MLR aircraft. 109 A "fly-off" would then be
held to determine which aircraft would be purchased. 110 In spite of this offer,
the OSD Comptroller instructed the Navy, to whom the funds were released, not
to spend the money. 111
The proposed compromise offered by Secretary Cheney was viewed
with guarded optimism by V-22 supporters in Congress. While Congress
welcomed the possible resolution to the feud over the V-22, they remained
suspicious that the V-22 would never enter into production. 112 Reps. Weldon
and Geren noted the widespread bipartisan support for the V-22 program as
evidenced by a letter signed by 219 representatives urging the President to
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"work with the Congress to continue the V-22 and tiltrotor technology for
sound military reasons, for sound transportation reasons, and for sound
economic reasons."113
A similar version of this letter was also signed by 40 senators and is indicative of
the widespread support for the Osprey program in the Senate. 114 Similar to
previous years, the Senate Appropriations Committee provided zero funding for
the popular House program for use as a bargaining chip during the
appropriations conference.
A turning point in the stand-off between OSD and the Congress
resulted in the awarding of a $550 million engineering and manufacturing
development contract to the Bell-Boeing team on 22 October 1992. 115 The new
"derivative" V-22 will closely resemble its baseline predecessor but will be 2000
pounds lighter. The FY 93 Defense Authorization bill echoed this new spirit of
cooperation between the executive and legislative branches. Funding for the CH-
53E, VH-3D Executive series helicopter, and the medium lift replacement aircraft
study were all nearly restored to their initial executive requested funding
levels.
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The V-22 team suffered a major setback when aircraft number 4
crashed on 20 July killing all seven personnel aboard. 117 The accident prompted
new doubts over the V-22 program. 118 Flight testing had been suspended
pending completion of the crash investigation. The crash of the XV-15 one month
later on 20 August did not strengthen the case for continuation of the V-22. 119
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Initial reasons for the crash of the V-22 involved speculation over
possible fuel starvation to the engines.120 The official Navy report indicates,
however, that an in-flight fire caused the engine to shutdown and weakened the
power-transmission shaft. 121 Investigators believe that a combustible fluid may
have pooled in the starboard engine housing and been ingested into the engine
air inlet while the nacelle was transitioning from forward to horizontal flight. 122
This resulted in a disruption of air flow through the engine and ultimately
resulted in a flash fire which lasted between 5-10 seconds and reached
temperatures of 900F. Investigators claim that the heat then damaged the carbon-
epoxy composite power transmission shaft. Not all personnel associated with the
investigation agree with the conclusions reached by the Navy. 123 The Bell-Boeing
team is currently developing two modifications to prevent a similar situation from
reoccurring. 124
The second crash of a V-22 aircraft increased the doubts in the Senate
over the program's reliability. Language in the Senate's FY93 Defense
Authorization bill stated that:
"In order to ensure that the program does not proceed too far before more
is known about the cause of the crash, the committee recommends a
provision that would prohibit obligation of more than 50 percent of the
fiscal year 1993 funds until the Commandant provides a crash investigation
report [by September 1] to the congressional defense committees."123
Similar language was included in the conference version of the FY93 Defense
Authorization bill.126 The Navy's crash investigation report infers that the cause
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of the accident was not the result of a design flaw and the V-22 received full
funding from the Congress.
C. OVERVIEW
The last four years have been witness to a struggle over the acquisition of
a specific weapon system that has gone from differences of opinion over the
composition of the U.S. armed forces to battles over the Constitution and the
powers granted therein to Congress to dictate how previously appropriated funds
shall be spent. The V-22 provides an excellent example of how the Executive and
Legislative branches attempt to achieve their respective goals of program
cancellation or continuation.
Given the pitched political battle between Congress and the Executive over
the V-22 Osprey program, the next two chapters will explore the applicability of
the parochial imperative, military-industrial complex, and personal policy
preference hypotheses laid out in the preceding chapter. Chapter IV will detail the
methodology to be employed in the examination of these potential explanations
for a member's position on the V-22. Chapter V will present the findings of the
data analysis within the context of the aforementioned hypotheses.
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IV. METHODOLOGY
The next question is how to test the hypotheses concerning congressional
behavior. This chapter will detail the statistical methods utilized and how such
concepts as parochial behavior or the influence of the MIC were operationalized
and investigated. It will offer a general model for explaining a member's voting
behavior and several specific models for investigating the applicability of the
three hypotheses detailed in Chapter II.
A. LOGIT ANALYSIS
Logit analysis is used in favor of Chi Square statistical analysis because of
the flexibility in data utilization that it offers. The usage of Chi Square analysis
requires that all data being examined be at the nominal level (e.g., Yes - No,
Republican - Democrat). 1 This basic level of data analysis is very useful for
variables that by their very nature can only possess one of two finite values. Chi
Square analysis, however, does not allow the for simultaneous consideration of
possible relationships to the dependent variable that additional independent
variables which may possess a value over a wide range (0 - 100).
The problem in utilizing the familiar technique of multivariate regression
analysis is its employment of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to calculate the best
fit for a straight line for all of the data points. This may lead to incorrect or
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misleading results. As Kenneth Mayer clearly points out in his work involving
aircraft carrier spending and congressional voting behavior, the assumed linear
relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable(s) is
"unwarranted" and the associated error term may be highly correlated—an
undesirable situation—to the independent variable(s) being examined. 2
Logit analysis is very similar to probit analysis which was first employed in
the life sciences to determine the relationship between various levels of drugs on
the health of laboratory animals. Probit analysis has been applied in several
studies involving congressional behavior. 3 Logit analysis allows the investigator
to explore the relationship of a dichotomous dependent variable (e.g., Yes or No)
and several independent variables that may possess values over a wide range.
The resultant S-shaped curve is the cumulative standard normal distribution.
The interpretation of the logit results, just as in the case of probit results, is
not as straightforward as in other statistical tests such as regression analysis or
Chi-square tests. Arnold provides a concise discussion of the problems
interpreting the probit coefficients:
A probit coefficient describes the impact of a particular variable on the
probability of an events occurrence, with its sign indicating whether the
variable increases or decreases the probability and its magnitude indicating
the extant of the effect. However, the impact of a particular variable is not
constant across all cases as it for regression; instead it varies according to the
values that the other variables take, principally because the underlying
relationships are assumed to be non-linear. Although the probit coefficients




A congressman's voting behavior regarding support for the V-22 can be
represented by the following model:
Voted =/(JobSj, Ideology;, Presidential Support,, PAQ, Personal,, Other,)
The member's vote is a function of the (1) number of direct jobs in the district or
state, (2) member's ideology, (3) degree to which the member supports the
president position on an issue, (4) amount of money contributed by the Political
Action Committees (PACs) of the prime contractors, (5) personal factors, and (6)
factors not included in this analysis.
Jobs is a measurement of the number of direct jobs generated at the first tier
subcontractor level by the V-22 appropriations to date for both the prime
contractors and subcontractors. There have been claims that there are over 201
first tier sub-contractors and that the total number of companies involved is
approximately 2000 in some 45 states. 6 Knowledgeable sources within Boeing
indicate that the V-22 subcontracting list covers 47 states and is over 35 pages in
length. Proprietary information restrictions prevented the author from obtaining
a complete accounting of all V-22 subcontractors. A partial list of subcontractors,
however, was obtained from Bell Helicopter-Textron Industries (BHTI). This list
shows 106 first tier subcontractors for both BHTI and Boeing Helicopter. Requests
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for information were sent to the two prime contractors as well as to the known
subcontractors on the number of jobs generated by work on the V-22.
Since the potential for constituency benefits (i.e., future jobs) can provide a
powerful incentive for supporting any program, information was also requested
regarding the possibility of future employment should the V-22 enter low scale
production.7 If the parochialism hypothesis of congressional behavior is correct,
then it is assumed that if either prime contract or, more importantly, subcontract
work provided jobs in a member's district or state, the member would support
funding for the V-22. The advantage of using logit analysis is that the number of
jobs or "threshold" that may cause a member to shift his vote from "No" to "Yes"
can be determined.
Jobs are also related to the presence of U.S. Marine Corps installations in a
member's district or state. 8 Mayer, who used Naval installations as a measure of
ideology, noted that personnel assigned to the branch of service involved would
be more supportive of that service's programs.9 It may be more accurate,
however, to say that the populace indirectly employed as a result of the presence
of the installation may be ones who are most supportive of a
program
—
particularly if it involves the mission of their local base. This statement
is based on the fact that rarely does the military member's state of residency and
duty station actually coincide. As such, the majority of service personnel are not
part of the congressmen's electoral constituency. While a member with a Marine
Corps installation in his or her district or state is assumed to be familiar with the
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needs of the Marine Corps, it is more likely that the intensity of the economic
benefits associated with that base, as noted in chapter 2, will motivate the
member to support funding for the V-22.
Related to jobs is the member's position on one of the committees or
subcommittees affecting authorizations and appropriations for a program such as
the V-22. Attention will be given to members from both chambers that sit on the
Armed Services Committees and the Appropriations Committees. If the military-
industrial complex hypothesis of congressional behavior is correct, it is anticipated
that members of these committees and related critical subcommittees will have
a large concentration of jobs in their districts or states as a result of the "strategic"
placement of subcontracts in key member's districts or states by the prime
contractors.
Ideology is a very broad and ill-defined term. It is possible to adapt some
concepts of ideology from the arena of international relations to the domestics
realm. K.J. Holsti defines ideology as "a framework for an explicit set of beliefs
(doctrine) that proports to explain reality and usually proscribes goals for political
action." 10 Thus, ideology is a collection of propositions (beliefs) that policy-
makers (or decision-makers) hold to be true even if they can not be verified. 11
Decision-makers use their ideology to establish the intellectual framework through
which they observe reality, establish goals, and as a rationalization and
justification for their choice of specific decisions. 12
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In this case it is meant to represent a member's likelihood to support or
oppose the V-22. This variable is based on two separate ratings systems, the
member's political party affiliation, and membership in the Tiltrotor Technology
Coalition.
The first rating system used is the liberal/conservative scale published by
the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). 13 While the criticism that groups
skew their ratings scales to further their specific cause, work by William Schaffer
has provided an external check on the reliability and validity of the ADA's
ratings. He found the ADA to be an effective rating organization and their
liberal/conservative measure to be valid. 14 On the ADA scale, the higher the
score (0-100), the more liberally oriented the member. A member with a high
rating would be likely to oppose funding for a weapon system that even the
Administration viewed as too costly and unnecessary.
The second rating system utilized was the National Security Index (NSI) as
published by the American Security Council (ASC). 13 Similar to the ADA scale,
the NSI has been found to be consistent over time. 16 The ASC believes in "peace
through strength" and rates members according to how they voted on ten key
defense issues during the previous election cycle. Members whom the ASC
perceives as furthering their goal of a strong defense are rated higher on the scale
(0-100) than members who are seen as weak supporters of defense. The NSI scale
provides a measure of a member's "hawkishness." 17 Thus it is assumed that a
member with a high NSI rating would support funding for the V-22. However,
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as noted in Chapter II, the predictive power of these ratings systems may be "less
than advertised."
Political party affiliation can also be a determining factor in how a member
votes.
18 Party affiliation is a result of an individual being in agreement with the
basic tenets of that political organization. Members were coded as Republican or
Democrat. It is assumed that Republicans are more "hawkish" than Democrats.
Given this assumption, it is expected that Republicans are more likely than
Democrats to support funding for the V-22.
Membership in the Tiltrotor Technology Coalition (TTC) is an external
manifestation of intellectual framework referred to in the previous definition of
ideology. It provides members with a structured physical organization to advance
their personal beliefs that the continued development of tiltrotor technology is in
the national interests—for a variety of reasons—of the United States. Membership
in the TTC is expected to indicate support for the V-22 Osprey.
James Lindsay notes that any study of weapons program funding must
include the possible effects of a popular president can exert over the congressional
decision-making process. 19 In his study involving SDI funding, he utilized the
percentage of voters that supported the president during the last election as a
measure of the constituency's support for the president's policies. This measure
may not be the wisest choice given the ups and downs of presidential popularity
over the course of four years. While it would be ideal to have popularity ratings
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for the chief executive before each vote, this type of data is not normally
available.
The Presidential Support (PS) rating as published by Congressional
Quarterly is used to determine the possible impact of the president on a
legislator's decision to support the V-22.20 The PS rating uses broad categories
of votes on issues such as domestic policy and economic affairs, as well as
defense/foreign policy, to determine the support rating for each individual
member. The calculation of the 1988 PS ratings involved tabulation of member's
performance on over 104 recorded votes on which the president took a position.
A member who supports the president's position is assumed to oppose continued
funding for the V-22.
Political Action Committee (PAC) contributions may also influence how a
member votes on an issue. Contribution data obtained from the Federal Election
Commission (FEC) on the amounts provided by the Textron Incorporated PAC
and the Boeing Company PAC will be compared to voting behavior (support) by
members on the V-22. Possible PAC contributions by subcontractors are not
considered as a majority of these companies are merely subsidiaries of larger
corporations and, as such, do not operate independent PACs. Since any
contributions that a member would receive under these circumstances could not
be directly traced back to a specific division of a corporation, any linkage to
support for the V-22 would be impossible to establish. It is assumed that members
receiving funding from these PACs will support the V-22.
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Personal factors are those elements that represent a member's personal
experience. It represents other variables that are not measured by the categories
of jobs, ideology, presidential support, and PACs. Congress has had a long "love
affair" with the U.S. Marine Corps. While there is no accurate method to quantify
this relationship, a crude measurement would be to examine the voting behavior
of former U.S. Marines, such as Sen. John Glenn (D-OH) or Rep. Jack Murtha CD-
PA), now serving in Congress as it relates to the V-22.21 It is assumed that
members who were in the Marine Corps are understanding of its needs and
sympathetic to its programs and would support funding for the V-22.
Regional factors are also included in the personal factors category. The area
of the nation where an individual grew up can have a profound effect on how
that person views an issue. It is often noted that Southern Democrats (a.k.a.
Dixiecrats) are more pro-defense than their Northern counterparts. The regional
breakdowns will be those used by Aage Clausen. 22
The category of "other" is simply the error factor associated with regression
techniques such as logit analysis. It is made up of the variables that are excluded
from the analysis for either identification or quantification reasons.
The votes utilized in this analysis are not as plentiful as one would imagine
given the high profile of this battle between Congress and the Executive over the
fate of the V-22. Voting patterns on overall authorization or appropriation levels
for defense—of which the V-22 is a part—may not be accurate indicators of a
member's feelings toward the V-22. As noted by Mayer, votes in favor of these
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bills have passed by a wide margin in the past and may not reflect the true
position an individual holds regarding a specific weapon system in the overall
package.23
Within the Senate, no roll call vote exists for a separate bill or amendment
authorizing or appropriating funds for the V-22. While several votes have been
taken on this issue, they were all voice votes that carried in favor of continuation
of funding for the V-22 Osprey aircraft.24
The House poses an equally perplexing situation. The 1991 Dire Emergency
Spending Bill contained a provision requiring the Administration to spend
previously allocated FY89 funds for the V-22.2d This roll call vote, however, is
unusable due the wide range of issues addressed in any supplemental spending
bill. An earlier vote on an amendment to eliminate funding for the V-22 occurred
in the House in 1989 but the V-22 was included in a package that was also trying
to strike funding for the F-14D.26 Since funding for both programs depended on
the outcome of the vote, no clear conclusions can be drawn from a member's
actions to support or oppose the amendment.
Since a "pure" vote on funding for the V-22 is not available for either
legislative chamber, some other measure of a member's support or opposition to
this program must be found. Fortunately, both the House and Senate have
provided documentation on support for the V-22 program. This support, as
previously noted in preceding chapter, is due a confluence of military, economic,
and transportation reasons. On 4 June 1992, the Senate sent a letter with 40
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signatures to President Bush urging him to work with Congress on the continued
development of tiltrotor technology and the V-22. 27 On 22 September 1992, the
House sent a similar letter with 219 signatures (over 50% of the members) to
President Bush urging cooperation and continuation of the V-22 program. 28 A
legislator's signature on either of these letters—in lieu of a clear roll call
vote—will be used to indicate support for the V-22 program.
C LOGIT EQUATIONS
In order to run the logit model for the entire Congress, it must be put into
an equation format as follows:
Support = a, + b 2 (Jobs) + b, (USMC Base) + b4 (ADA) + b 5 (NSI) + b6 (Party)
+ b7 (TTC) + b 8 (Pres.Support) + b, (PAC) + b 10 (Fmr. USMC) + e
(Equation 1)
The variables are:
SUPPORT = 1 if the member signed the letter urging President Bush to
continue the V-22.
= if the member did not sign the letter.
JOBS = number of direct jobs, current or potential, in a member's
district due to work related to the V-22.
USMC BASE = 1 if the member has a Marine Corps installation is his/her
district.
= if otherwise.
ADA = member's liberal /conservative score.
NSI = member's "national security index" score.
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PARTY = 1 if the member is a Republican.
= if the member is a Democrat.
TTC = 1 if the member is in the TTC.
= if otherwise.
PRES. SUPPORT = Presidential Support (PS) score assigned by Congressional
Quarterly.
PAC = Amount of money contributed by prime contractor PACs.
FMR. USMC = 1 if the member is retired U.S. Marine.
= if otherwise.
The equation will be run for both the Senate and the House and a
comparison of findings will be discussed in the following chapter.
The equation also will be run to investigate the effects of Committee
membership in both the Senate and the House on the decision to support or
oppose the V-22. The new equation would be as follows:
Support = a, + b 2 (Jobs) + b, (USMC Base) + b4 (ADA) + b 5 (NSI) + b6 (Party)
+ b7 (TTC) + b8 (Pres.Support) + b, (PAC) + b 10 (Fmr. USMC)
+ bn (Committee) + e
(Equation 2)
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The new variable is:
Senate
COMMITTEE = 1 if the member is assigned to SASC or SAC.
= if otherwise.
House
COMMITTEE = 1 if the member is assigned to HASC or HAC.
= if otherwise.
The equation will also be run to investigate the effects of membership on
one of the SASC, HASC, SAC, or HAC subcommittees that have direct jurisdiction
over the V-22 and would appear as:
Support = a, + b2 (Jobs) + b 3 (USMC Base) + b4 (ADA) + b5 (NSI) + b6 (Party)
+ b7 (TTC) + b8 (Pres.Support) + b9 (PAC) + b 10 (Fmr. USMC)
+ b12 (Subcommittee) + e
(Equation 3)
The new variable is:
Senate
SUBCOMMITTEE = 1 if member is assigned to the SASC subcommittee
on Conventional Forces and Alliance Defense, Defense
Industry and Technology, Projection Forces and
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Regional Defense, or Readiness, Sustainability and
Support or the SAC subcommittee on Defense.
= if otherwise.
House
SUBCOMMITTEE = 1 if member is assigned to the HASC subcommittee
on Research and Development, Procurement and
Military Nuclear Systems, Readiness, or Seapower and
Strategic and Critical Materials or the HAC
subcommittee on Defense.
= if otherwise.
Additional variations will account for the effect of region and political party
affiliation on the voting behavior of a representative on the V-22. Estimates
utilizing the logit equations will be calculated for the both chambers and several
respective subpopulations.
At the committee and subcommittee level, the logit equation will utilize
actual votes as opposed to the surrogate measure of support. Since mark-up
sessions are normally conducted in closed session, only one cases is available for
examination. It is the mark-up session of the House version of the FY90 Defense
Authorization bill conducted by the HASC subcommittee on Procurement and
Military Nuclear Systems. The equation will be as follows:
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Vote = a, + b2 (Jobs) + bj (USMC Base) + b4 (ADA) + b, (NSI) + b„ (Party)
+ b7 (TTC) + b B (Pres.Support) + b, (PAC) + b 10 (Fmr. USMC)
+ bn (Committee) + e
(Equation 4)
The independent variables (those to the right of the equal sign) remain
unchanged. The dependent variable is:
Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems Mark-up
VOTE = 1 if the member voted against the reinstatement of the
original Cheney procurement submission as offered by Rep.
Aspin which would have deleted funding for the V-22.
= if the member voted otherwise.
D. PITFALLS
In his work, Mayer found that political party affiliation and a member's NSI
rating had a high degree of multicollinearity. 29 Multicollinearity exists when two
independent variables are very highly correlated to each other. In other words,
what appears to be two independent variables measuring two different
phenomenon is actually two independent variables measuring the same
phenomenon. This can skew the results of the analysis and lead to incorrect
observations about the effect of an independent variable on the dependent
variable. Lindsay noted that the ADA and NSI ratings also were subject to
multicollinearity.30 Both of these findings will be tested and the variables of
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political party and the ADA rating excluded from future computations should the
problem of multicollinearity manifest itself in this study.
One additional pitfall is associated with the utilization of the PS rating. As
Congressional Quarterly notes, however, "its usefulness diminishes as the need
for detail rises."31 The degree of explanation provided by this variable will be
carefully interpreted and checked for multicollinearity against political party
affiliation.
With these possible pitfalls in mind, the findings of the logit analyses are
presented in the following chapter.
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V. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS
Prior to examining the findings of the logit analysis, this section discusses
the construction and limitations of the data base, how these limitations affect the
outcome of the statistical analysis, and the content of the data tables. Following
this section, the findings will be presented in the following order: 102nd Senate,
102nd House, and the 101 st HASC Procurement subcommittee vote. Each of these
major data presentation areas will present the results for the entire chamber and
for respective subpopulations such as political party affiliation or regional
variations in terms of the applicable logit models detailed in the preceding
chapter.
A. INTRODUCTION
1. Data Base Limitations
The data base contains both nominal and interval entries for each
respective Senator or Representative. Most information such as a member's
National Security Index (NSI) rating or membership in the Tiltrotor Technology
Coalition (TTC) was readily available. The exception to this was information on
the names, physical locations, and related employment data for known V-22
subcontractors. While the location of a weapons system prime contractor is
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generally well known, the names and locations of subcontractors fall under the
auspices of "proprietary information."
In response to the 106 surveys sent out to gather information on site
location, nature of the work performed, and related direct employment data (past,
present, and future), responses were received for 30% of the queries. From these
responses, information was extracted on such events as projected jobs should the
V-22 enter low scale production. This data forms the interval level measurement
of the independent variable JOBS,. The data was then entered for the respective
representative. Both senators from a state received "credit" for V-22 related jobs
since each one can claim overlapping constituencies.
Interval level data is preferred since it would provide a clearer picture
of a member's response to various numbers of V-22 jobs. However, since the
response rate was not as high as anticipated—and thus may not represent a true
subsample—V-22 related employment was also coded at the nominal level (1 =
Yes, = No) as represented by the independent variable JOBSN . This resulted in
25 states being coded in the Senate as hosting either a prime or first tier
subcontractor and assumes the presence of V-22 related employment. In the
House, this approach resulted in 122 districts being coded as either hosting or
being located within 20 miles of the plant site for a prime or first tier
subcontractor. The distinction between the number of jobs generated disappears
at this level. However, it does provide for a much larger sample size.
110
Parallel calculations utilizing the interval and nominal measurement
of employment (JOBS, and JOBSN ) were run for each logit equation applied to the
various populations and subpopulations. The findings from these parallel
computations are presented in the sections detailing the results for the Senate,
House, and HASC Procurement Subcommittee.
2. Data Base and Software Limitations
The data base was examined via JMP (Version 2.0) statistical software.
The JMP program recognizes empty cells (no information) in the data base as
"missing" and removes that row's information from multivariate calculations such
as those detailed by the logit equations utilized in this study. For example, at the
JOBSN level via the overall logit equation (Model I), only 97 observations (OBS)
are noted. The reason is that three of the senators were newly elected and did not
have NSI ratings. This feature alleviates the task of eliminating freshmen from the
overall calculations.
To verify that the automatic elimination of those rows with missing
information does not skew the effect of other variable that may be present for the
affected member, a bivariate test is conducted between the dependent variable
(support) and each of the independent variables. Any statistically significant
events, if not detected in the subsequent runs of the major logit equations, were
investigated and analyzed.
Prior to the execution of any of the logit equations—for both the entire
population and any related subpopulations—a test for mulricollinearity was
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conducted to verify no excessive relationships exist between the independent
variables being utilized in the particular equation. On occasion, this resulted in
a different "mix" of independent variables for such subpopulations as Democrats
or Republicans or TTC members or Southern Democrats.
Each multicollinearity test started with all independent variables listed
in the basic model to ensure standardization between the ensuing calculations.
The model was then tailored as required to eliminate any relationships with an
R2 of > .8 with an eye to maintaining the presence of each major area listed in the
general logit model. In questionable instances, similar runs were conducted
substituting the related variables to verify that no statistically significant events
went undetected.
3. Terminology and Data Table Interpretation
Each of the data presentation tables list the independent variable along
the vertical or Y-axis. Unless specified, the dependent variable being tested for is
SUPPORT. Each cell contains two numbers. The top number is the parameter
estimate. The parameter estimate is the logit coefficient for the respective term
(independent variable) in the overall model. It also can assume a positive or
negative value. The original coding of the independent variables was done to
obtain positive values if the assumptions of the major schools regarding
congressional behavior on defense voting prove to be true. For example, if
Political Action Committee (PAC) contributions are positively related to support
for the V-22, then the values for the parameter TTL PAC should be positive.
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The second number that appears below the parameter estimate in
parentheses ( ) is the Prob>ChiSq (probability of obtaining by chance alone a Chi
Square value greater than the one computed) or more commonly known as the
p value. If the p value is less than (<) .05, the parameter is considered to be
statistically significant. For quick identification, p values <.05 contained in the data
presentation tables are in bold face.
The term R-squared ( R2 ) is a measure of how well the constructed
model predicts the event being examined. In this instance, the event was support
or non-support for the V-22. The value of R2 ranges from 0.00 to 1.00 with higher
values indicating greater predictive effectiveness of the model. However, logit
analysis R2 values are normally lower than those found in normal regression
analysis.
Other terms that describe characteristics of the behavior of the
independent variables (parameters) in the overall model are unstable, zeroed, and
biased. The data is determined to be unstable (indicated by * ) if the reliability of
the estimate becomes questionable. The parameter is listed as zeroed (indicated
by # ) if it is a linear function of the parameter above it and thus zeroed by the
logit calculation. The parameter is listed as biased (indicated by ® ) if the number
is not uniquely estimable by the logit calculation.
Data table interpretation is relatively straightforward. The parameters
listed along the vertical detail the independent variables used in the particular
logit model. The headers along the horizontal describe the population and related
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subpopulations being tested via the model. Ceils that contain a series of dashed
lines ( ) indicate the variable was used but not present for the subpopulation
being tested. For example, it is possible to have subpopulations where no former
U.S. marines (FMR.USMC) are present. This occurrence does not affect the outcome
or calculations of the other parameters.
The data table may also contain a cell that is "blocked out" either
because the variable is being controlled for in one of the subpopulations (e.g.,
PARTY) or a problem with multicollinearity exists with another variable. If the
situation is one of multicollinearity, as was normally the case between the
Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) rating and the NSI rating, it will be
identified below the data table.
Following the data table, the results are examined in terms of their
support or lack of support for the three major explanations for congressional
defense voting behavior. The primary variable that represents the parochial
imperative hypothesis is jobs. Related to possible parochial behavior is the
variable USMC BASE. The primary variable for the Military-Industrial Complex
(MIC) hypothesis is TTL PAC. The final hypothesis is personal preference and is
primarily represented by the variable NSI. Another measure of personal preference
is found in the variable FMR. usmc which assumes a positive directional
relationship between prior service in the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) and support
for a primarily USMC program—the V-22.
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The variable TTC and those related to membership on the armed
services and appropriations committees and germane subcommittees are less clear
as to which school of thought they fall under. Membership in the Tiltrotor
Technology Coalition TTC) could be viewed either as a physical manifestation of
the MIC or as a forum the member uses to advance his or her personal preference
for developing tiltrotor technology. Committee membership could be interpreted
as members using their position to obtain defense dollars for their constituents or
as a means for members to pursue their policy interests and objectives. Where
these variables fit into the three competing hypotheses will be addressed at the
end of each major section.
The focus of this section now turns to the presentation and analysis of
the findings for the Senate, House, and the HASC Procurement Subcommittee
mark-up vote.
B. FINDINGS: 102nd SENATE (1991-92)
How well do the three major explanations of congressional behavior on
defense issues
—
parochialism, Military-Industrial Complex theory, and personal
preference
—
predict support for the V-22 within the Senate? As noted in Chapter
II, only one study—which was questioned on methodological grounds—found
evidence of parochialism. 1 None of the studies found that Political Action
Committee (PAC) contributions were linked to voting behavior by a Senator. The
majority of the studies, however, did find overwhelming support of the
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importance of ideology or personal preference as an explanation for predicting
and explaining congressional defense voting behavior.
Will these finding be repeated in the case of the V-22? The following sections
list the bivariate (Y by X) analyses and subsequent multivariate (Y by Xs) analyses
findings for the entire Senate, the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Senate
Appropriations Committee, and various subpopulations.
1. Full Senate
a. Senate Bivariate Analysis
The bivariate relationships between support for the V-22 and the
full Senate can be found in Appendix A (Table A.l). Statistically significant events
detected by this bivariate analysis in the Senate were party (p = 0.0262), Tiltrotor
Technology Coalition or TTC (p = 0.0000), and DEF (p = 0.0114).
Within the Senate, PARTY was significant because only 23 (52.%) of
the Republicans, who were assumed to favor defense spending, indicated support
for the V-22. The anticipated number of Republican supporters was expected to
be much higher. The 17 Democrats (30.% of all Democrats) was, conversely, much
higher than anticipated.
The large number of Republican senators that support the V-22 is
surprising given the fact that it was a Republican-led Administration that sought
to "kill" the aircraft program. If the president is as influential as some believe,
then one would have anticipated the "rank-and-file" in Congress to fall in line and
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support the president's position. Had this been the case, one would have expected
the support to split along party lines. Thus it was the bi-partisan nature of Senate
support that makes party a significant event.
The variable TTC was significant because of the 21 Senators who
are members, 18 (86%) of them signed the letter to President Bush supporting the
V-22 program. This variable proves to be a strong predictor of support for the V-
22. To verify that support as indicated by the letter to President Bush was not
highly correlated with membership in the TTC, a collinearity test was done and
found that SUPPORT = .4973 TTC (i.e., not >.8). As shown in a bivariate test
involving support and TTC, 22 non-members signed the letter (55°/.).
b. Senate Multivariate Analyses
The three logit equations detailed in the previous chapter were run
for the full Senate and with a control for political party affiliation. The detailed
results of the first logit equation are shown below in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. The
results of the second logit equation which incorporates membership on the SASC
or SAC and the third logit equation which tests for the significance of
membership on V-22 cognizant SASC or SAC subcommittees are found in
Appendix B.
According to the parochial hypothesis, one would expect the
presence of V-22 related employment to be a significant predictor of support for
the program. Yet logit equation 1 found no statistically significant relationship
between support and jobs, or JOBSn . In fact, among Senate Democrats, the
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direction of the relationship was opposite of what the parochial imperative would
predict (i.e., a positive relationship between support and jobs).
TABLE 5.1: LOGIT EQUATION 1 - SENATE (JOBS,)















































p values in parentheses
Multicollinearity between NSI and PS within the Senate and among Republicans.
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TABLE 5.2: LOGIT EQUATION 1 - SENATE (JOBSN )













































p values in parentheses
Multicollinearity between NSI and PS within the Senate and among Republicans.
The MIC proponents would expect to see a positive and statistically
significant relationship between SUPPORT and TTL PAC if the votes-for-dollars
hypothesis is correct. The data contained in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, however, did not
support this prediction. While the direction of the relationship was as expected
(positive), none of the p values were below the .05 level of significance.
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The personal preference hypothesis holds that the relationship
between support and NSI should be positive in direction and statistically
significant. Yet the data obtained via logit equation 1 did not overwhelmingly
support this assumption. Only when JOBS, (Table 5.1) was employed did NSI
achieve significance within the Republican subpopulation of the Senate. The
directional relationship for NSI was as predicted with the exception of the
Democratic subpopulation of the Senate and was consistent regardless of which
coding scheme for employment was used.
Membership in the TTC was statistically significant in both cases
for the Senate and for the Democrat and Republican subpopulations when JOBSN
was used in logit equation 1. The direction of the relationship between TTC and
support was as anticipated (i.e., positive) in all cases.
Logit equation 2 (Tables B.l and B.2) added the variable
committee to see if membership on the Senate Armed Services Committee
(SASC) or Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC) was a significant predictor of
behavior on the V-22.
As in logit equation 1, the parochial theory was not supported by
the findings and the directional relationships remained the same. Lack of support
for the MIC hypothesis continued and the positive directional relationship was
seen in all instances with the exception of the Democratic subpopulation. The
significance of NSI remained >.05 and the directional relationships displayed in
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 were repeated.
120
Just as in logit equation 1, TTC remained a significant variable in
the full Senate and for both Democrats and Republicans when JOBSN was utilized.
Logit equation 3 (Tables B.3 and B.4) replaced the variable
committee with the variable subcommittee to determine if membership on the
relevant SASC or SAC subcommittees was a significant predictor of behavior on
the V-22.
Once again, the parochial hypothesis was not in agreement with
the data obtained via logit equation 3. V-22 related employment remained an
insignificant predictor of support within the Senate for the program. The
directional relationship between jobs, and support remained consistent but when
JOBSN was utilized in the calculations, the direction shifted from positive to
negative for the Republican subpopulation.
The nature of the relationship between TTL pac and SUPPORT
remained unchanged from logit equation 2. Among Republicans when jobsN was
used, logit equation 3 showed a positive and statistically significant relationship
(p = 0.0303) between support and TTL pac. The votes-for-dollars hypothesis was
only partially borne out by the data obtained thus far.
The primary indicator of personal preference, nsi, achieved
statistical significance within the Republican subpopulation regardless of the level
of employment data utilized. Directional relationships continued as in the
previous two iterations. To this point, the NSI rating has not proven as effective
as past studies have indicated.
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A secondary indicator of personal preference, fmr. usmc, failed to
achieve significance and the directional relationship to support shifted as JOBSN
was substituted for JOBS, within the three logit equations. Although not
statistically significant, one would have anticipated that all 9—as opposed to only
5 out of the nine—former U.S. marines in the Senate would have supported the
V-22. The data, however, showed this not to be the case.
Membership on the SAC Defense (DEF) subcommittee was
statistically significant for the entire Senate (p = 0.0181) when jobsN was utilized
and echoed the relationship discovered during the bivariate analysis of the Senate
(see Appendix A). DEF was also significant among the Republican subpopulation
(p = 0.0126) when JOBSN was utilized in logit equation 3. Of the eight Republicans
on the SAC Defense subcommittee, seven of them signed the letter to President
Bush supporting the V-22.
Membership on the SASC Defense Industry and Technology (DI &
T) subcommittee (p = 0.0102) also proved to be a statistically significant event only
when JOBSN was utilized in logit equation 3. Of the three Republicans on the DI
6 T subcommittee, both Senators Mack (FL) and Coats (IN) indicated support for
the V-22.
As in the previous equations, TTC remained a significant variable
in the full Senate and for both Democrats and Republicans when JOBSN was
utilized.
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2. The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC)
a. SASC Bivariate Analysis
Unlike the full Senate, there were no significant events detected in
the SASC bivariate analysis (see Table A. 2). The results of logit equation 1 are
shown in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 while those of logit equation 3 are found in Appendix
TABLE 5.3: LOGIT EQUATION 1 - SASC (JOBS,)
p values in parentheses
»
unstable data zeroed biased
Multicollinearity between nsi and PS and jOBSj and fmr. usmc.
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TABLE 5.4: LOGIT EQUATION 1 - SASC (JOBSN )









































p values in parentheses
»
unstable data
Multicollinearity between NSI and PS and jOBS
(
and FMR. USMC.
As illustrated by Table 5.3 and Table CI, interval employment
parameter estimates among SASC Democrats could not be obtained due to a
unique confluence of constraints on the independent variable and interval level
employment data. Of the 11 Democrats on the SASC, only 1 signed the letter. This
individual, Sen. John Glenn (D-OH), has an empty data cell in the data base and
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thus SUPPORT can only assume one level— or No—for the remaining 10
Democrats. This situation unfortunately precludes any analysis of why a member
may have supported the V-22. -
As noted in the bivariate analysis (see Table A. 2), none of the
variables such as TTC retained statistical significance during the examination of
the SASC via logit equations 1 and 3. Any possible observations concerning the
nature of the relationships between support and the other variables must be
tempered by the fact that a majority of the data was found to be unstable and that
the number of observations was very low.
The relationship between JOBS and SUPPORT for the V-22 did not
emerge at the committee level of analysis. The direction of the relationship was
mixed and shifted from positive to negative with no discernable pattern in either
logit equation 1 or 3.
The directional behavior of the main indicator of the MIC
hypothesis, ttl pac was consistent when the full SASC was evaluated but became
less clear when the subpopulations of SASC Democrats and Republicans were
examined.
The primary measure of personal preference, NSI, exhibited a
consistent negative relationship to support which was not anticipated. The
performance of FMR. USMC remained mixed and inconclusive.
The statistical significance of membership on the SASC Dl & T
subcommittee also failed to repeat at the committee level of analysis.
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3. The Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC)
a. SAC Bivariate Analysis
The SAC bivariate analysis indicated JOBSN (JOBSN = SUB.VNDR.)
with a value of (p = 0.0212) and def (p = 0.0152) as significant events (see Table
A.3).
Membership on the SAC Defense subcommittee, DEF, was
significant in both the full Senate and the SAC. Of the 18 members, 12 (67%)
signed the letter of support for the V-22. Within the SAC, JOBSN took on statistical
significance. Of 28 total members, 10 of the 14 (71%) who had a prime or
subcontractor in their state signed the letter of support for the V-22. At this level
of analysis, there were strong indications of parochial behavior by members of the
SAC.
b. SAC Multivariate Analyses
How well do these two statistically significant findings hold up
under multivariate examination? The parameter estimates from logit equation 1
are listed below in Tables 5.5 and 5.6. The data from the logit equation 3 is
provided in Appendix D.
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TABLE 5.5: LOOT EQUATION 1 - SAC (JOBS.)











































p values in parentheses
unstable data
Multicollinearity between nsi and PS for the SAC and SAC Democrats.
127
TABLE 5.6: LOGIT EQUATION 1 - SAC (JOBSN )











































p values in parentheses
»
unstable data
Multicollinearity between NSI and PS for the SAC and SAC Democrats.
Logit equation 1 employed at the committee level yielded no
statistically significant events for either the full SAC or the two political
subpopulations.
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Although not significant, the consistent positive relationship
between support and JOBSj and JOBSN was in accordance with the directional
behavior predicted by the parochial hypothesis. The significance of JOBSN seen in
the simple bivariate analysis of the SAC failed to repeat under multivariate
conditions. For this reason, the significance of JOBSN displayed under bivariate
conditions must viewed cautiously when applied to a multivariate environment.
Generalizations from one level of analysis (bivariate) to another level of analysis
(multivariate) based on a single observation must be avoided. This problem is
referred to as ecological fallacy and can result in misleading and incorrect
conclusions.2
The behavior of the relationship between support and TTL PAC was
the opposite of the anticipated direction in five of the six instances detailed in
SAC logit equation 1. The MIC hypothesis contends that contributions by PACs
will lead to support (i.e., a positive relationship) but the data at this level failed
to support that assertion.
Similar to the behavior of the employment variables, nsi retained
a positive relationship with SUPPORT in all instances under logit equation 1. The
behavior of the variable FMR. USMC was inconclusive as it shifted from positive
in the SAC to negative among Democrats and was not present among
Republicans.
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Data obtained from logit equation 3 provided no significant events
and offered an inconsistent pattern of behavior between support and the major
indices of the three competing explanations for congressional behavior.
4. Senate Subpopulations
Several major subpopulation variants were conducted utilizing the full
Senate while controlling for geographic region, such as being a Democrat from the
South or a member of the TTC. Analysis was also conducted at the SAC Defense
subcommittee level. Finally, the possible motivations for becoming a member of
the TTC were explored by replacing the dependent variable support with TTC
and utilizing the framework delineated in logit equation 1.
a. Geographic Regions
To detect any possibly statistically significant relationships that
may be "masked" by presence of any one region, the United States was divided
into the eight geographic regions established in Chapter IV. Logit equation 1 was
then run for the nation minus each particular region in turn. To expose any
hidden statistically significant events that might have been diluted by viewing the
nation as a whole, each region was examined in isolation via logit equation 1. The
results of these analyses are found in Appendix E. In all cases, ADA and PS were
found to be collinear with NSI and dropped in favor the "hawkishness" rating.
The parochial hypothesis was marginally supported by the finding
that the variable usmc base was significant only when the Southern region of the
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nation was excluded from logit equation 1 (see Table E.7). The significance was
consistent when data sources for the measure of employment changed from jOBSj
(USMC BASE: p = 0.0378) to JOBSN (USMC BASE: p = 0.0050). Of the ten states
comprising the Southern region, four (GA, NC, SC, and VA) were coded as
hosting U.S. Marine Corps installations. This parochial behavior involving military
bases is not all that surprising and expected as noted in Chapter II.
The major indices of the MIC and personal preference—TTL pac
and NSI respectively—did not achieve statistical significance and exhibited no
clear cut pattern of behavior regarding the relationship between either variable
and support.
As noted in earlier analyses—and not in keeping with the
anticipated relationship with support—FMR. USMC exhibited a negative
relationship with support with the exception of only two regional exclusions. The
instances of regional exclusion where this did not occur were Mountain (jobsn )
and Southern (JOBSN and jobs,).
The only consistent statistically significant parameter detected when
a region was excluded via logit equation 1 was ttc. In all cases where the region
was excluded—with the exception of the Southern region where TTC approached
statistical significance (p = 0.0618) but did not achieve it—TTC was consistently
significant regardless of the level of employment data utilized. The usage of
JOBSn , however, provided lower p values TTC.
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There was no consistent pattern detected in unanticipated
directional relationships when each region was viewed in isolation.
b. Southern Democrat Analysis
The full Senate was examined to control for the influence of the
"Dixiecrats." Southern Democrats are often more "hawkish" than other Democrats
and tend to be pro-defense. In the 102nd Senate, the average NSI rating for the
Southern Democrats was 69 while the remaining Democrats averaged 26. Logit
equations 1, 2, and 3 were utilized to determine if any statistically significant
events were present that examinations of the full Senate may have missed due to
the presence of the "hawkish" Southern Democrats. The findings of logit equation
1 are given in Tables 5.7 and 5.8. Appendix F contains the results of logit
equations 2 and 3.
The parochial hypothesis was again thwarted as neither JOBSj or
JOBSn achieved significance. The directional relationship patterns were consistent
showing positive relationships across all three models when Southern Democrats
were excluded and when Southern Democrats were examined in isolation. When
the remaining Democrats (i.e., Non-Southern Democrats) were examined, the
relationship between support and JOBS, and JOBSN becomes negative.
The variable usmc base did achieve significance (p = 0.0487) only
under equation 2 for the Senate when the Southern Democrats were excluded and
jobs, was used to measure employment. Again the parochial nature of bases was
not unexpected.
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TABLE 5.7: LOGIT EQUATION 1

















































p values in parentheses
unstable data
Multicollinearity between NSI and PS for the exclusion of Non-Southern Democrats and
Southern Democrats.
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TABLE 5.8: LOGIT EQUATION 1





















































p values in parentheses
*
unstable data
Multicollinearity between nsi and PS for the exclusion of Non-Southern Democrats and
Southern Democrats.
TTL PAC came very close to achieving statistical significance within
the Senate when Southern Democrats were excluded and jobs, is utilized to
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measure employment benefits (p = 0.0505). However, the lack of statistical
significance of TTL PAC to this point continued to diminish the credibility of the
MIC proponents. The relationship between TTL PAC and support was positive
across all three equations with the exception of the subpopulation non-Southern
Democrats when JOBSj was used in equations 2 and 3.
The performance of the main personal preference indicator, NSI,
was erratic from equation to equation and no clear pattern emerged regarding the
relationship between NSI and SUPPORT at this level of analysis.
Common to both Table 5.7 and 5.8 was the statistical significance
of TTC when Southern Democrats were excluded from logit equation 1. The
significance of this variable continued in equations 2 and 3 regardless of whether
jobs
1
or JOBSN was used.
The significance of DEF (p = 0.0074) was repeated in equation 3
when JOBSN was utilized for employment measurement. The elimination of
Southern Democrats had no effect on the members of the SAC Defense
subcommittee that were signatories to the 4 June 1992 letter to President Bush
supporting the V-22.
c. TTC Membership
Since the parameter TTC has been so significant in the full Senate
models, the possibility existed of this event masking the influence of other
parameters such as JOBS or TTL PAC. To see if this was indeed the case,
membership in the TTC was controlled and logit models I, II, and III run for both
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members and non-members. Coincident with these calculations, the effect of party
was investigated. The first sets of data, Tables 5.9 and 5.10, deal with those
senators (21: 13R - 8D) that are members of the TTC. The corresponding data for
logit equations 2 and 3 can be found in Appendix G.
TABLE 5.9: LOGIT EQUATION 1 - SENATE TTC MEMBERS (JOBS,)








































p values in parentheses
unstable data
Multicollinearity between TTL pac and jOBSj among Republicans
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TABLE 5.10: LOGIT EQUATION 1 - SENATE TTC MEMBERS (jOBSN )






































p values in parentheses
»
unstable data
Multicollinearity between FMR. USMC and NSI among Republicans
The evaluation of the TTC members of the Senate failed to yield
statistical significance for either measure of employment across all three
equations. The nature of the relationship between SUPPORT and JOBSj and JOBSN
was generally positive for equation 1. This relationship became more
unpredictable in equations 2 and 3.
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The variable TTL PAC, while it failed to achieve significance in
support of the MIC hypothesis, exhibited highly predictable behavior. The
relationship to support was positive in all instances across equations 1, 2, and 3
with the exception of Republicans when equation 2 and JOBSN were brought
together.
The personal preference hypothesis failed to emerge as the
dominant explanation as NSI and other secondary indicators did not achieve
significance. The relationship between NSI and Republicans was positive and
consistent in all three equations. The relationship between NSI and SUPPORT was
consistent across all three equations for the TTC member senators and for the
subpopulation of Democrats. The problem is that it was in the wrong direction.
Committee and subcommittee membership did not attain statistical
significance via equations 2 and 3 respectively and directional relationships were
inconsistent.
The second set of data tables associated with controlling for the
influence of membership in the TTC were the calculations involving those
members of the Senate who had not joined the TTC. Tables 5.11 and 5.12 provide
the results of the calculations done via logit equation 1. The data for logit
equations 2 and 3 for non-TTC Senators can be found in Appendix H.
The leading indicator thus far of any type of parochial behavior on
the part of senators and support for the V-22 is not JOBS but USMC BASE. The
directional relationships between support and JOBS was inconsistent within and
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across models 1, 2, and 3. USMC BASE was significant (p = 0.0314) in logit equation
2 when JOBS! was utilized to measure employment.















































p values in parentheses
unstable data
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p values in parentheses
unstable data
The variable TTL PAC was consistent with regard to the direction
of its relationship to SUPPORT only within equation 1 (Tables 5.11 and 5.12) and
quickly became erratic in equations 2 and 3.
The NSI indicator of personal preference was inconsistent with
regard to the direction of its relationship to SUPPORT not only within equation 1
(Tables 5.11 and 5.12) but also in equations 2 and 3. Only among non-TTC
senators was NSI normally in the anticipated direction (i.e., positive) with the
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exception being seen in equation 3 when JOBS, was used to measure employment
(Table H.3).
Further exploration into the TTC led to the utilization of a variation
of logit equation 1 to search for events that may have statistical significance and
could explain why a member might join the TTC. Logit equation 5 is given below.
TTC = a, + b2 (jobs) + b3 (USMC Base) + b4 (ADA) + b, (NSI) + b6 (Party)
+ b8 (Pres.Support) + b, (PAC) + b 10 (Fmr. USMC) + e
(Equation 5)
The results of this investigation are provided below in Tables 5.13 and 5.14.
The variable of jobs continued to be statistically insignificant. It
appears that employment-related reasons were not a suitable predictor for a
member to join the TTC. In fact, in Table 5.13, JOBS, was negatively related to
membership in the TTC!
With regard to the TTC being an outgrowth of the MIC, the
statistical significance of TTL pac (p = 0.0260) among Democrats when jobs, was
used in equation 4, appears to be convincing evidence of this phenomenon. The
problem lies in the negative relationship between being a member of the TTC and
the receipt of PAC money from the two prime contractors. Further analysis
indicated that the lack of PAC receipts from Textron ( -0.0006028 / p = 0.0276)
and not Boeing (0.00029344 / p = 0.4873) was a significant predictor of a
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congressman joining the TTC! Surely the TTC, by this yardstick, is not a mere
manifestation of the nefarious MIC.
TABLE 5.13: LOGIT EQUATION 4 - SENATE TTC INVESTIGATION (JOBS.)














































TABLE 5.14: LOGIT EQUATION 4 - SENATE TTC INVESTIGATION (JOBSn )







































p values in parentheses
*
unstable data
What then is the TTC? The TTC represents a V-22 unique forum
for members to pursue what see believe is good policy. As noted above, it is not
a club for pursuing parochial interests nor is it a coalition to seek increased PAC
contributions from the prime contractors. The TTC provides a physical framework
for a member to advance his or her personal preference for the continued
development of tiltrotor technology. As such, membership is a result of personal
choice, not parochial or industry pressures.
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While the nsi parameter did not achieve statistical significance, the
directional relationship was positive among the Senate and among Democrats.
The relationship was reversed among Republicans regardless of what measure of
employment was used.
d. SAC Defense Subcommittee
The final subpopulation to be examined in the Senate is the SAC
Defense subcommittee. A bivariate analysis found that JOBSN was the sole
statistically significant event (p = 0.0027). Of the nine members that had either a
prime contractor or subcontractor in their state, all nine (100%) signed the letter
of support to President Bush. Of these nine members only four (44%) were
members of the TTC. Would the connection between JOBSN and SUPPORT be
repeated in the multivariate analysis?
Since def was a significant parameter, the members of the SAC
Defense subcommittee were evaluated via logit model I. Tables 5.15 and 5.16
provide the results of this investigation. Appendix I provides the results of the
investigation of the influence of the TTC at the SAC Defense subcommittee level.
Only results for non-members of the TTC can be obtained since all TTC members
on the SAC Defense subcommittee signed the letter urging President Bush to
continue the V-22 program.
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TABLE 5.15: LOGIT EQUATION 1
SAC DEF. SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBER (JOBS,)

















































TABLE 5.16: LOGIT EQUATION 1
SAC DEF. SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBER (JOBSn )







































p values in parentheses
unstable data
No one parameter achieved statistical significance during the
analysis of the SAC Defense subcommittee and its associated subpopulations of
Democratic and Republican members. The major indicator of the parochial theory,
employment, showed a negative directional relationship with SUPPORT in all cases
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when JOBS, was utilized. When JOBSN was utilized to measure employment, only
among Republicans was this negative relationship repeated. The significance
displayed during bivariate analysis failed to re-emerge under multivariate
conditions.
The major indicator of the influence of the MIC, TTL pac, was in
the anticipated direction—with the exception of Democrats—regardless of which
measurement of employment was utilized. As in the case above, however, the
MIC parameter, TTL PAC, did not achieve statistical significance for either the
overall subcommittee model or the party subpopulations.
The major indicator of ideology, NSI, was also in the anticipated
direction for the overall subcommittee. Among the subpopulation of Democrats,
the direction was reversed from the expected direction regardless of which
measure of employment was used. Among Republicans, the direction of the
relationship between NSI and support was inconsistent from jOBSj to JOBSN .
5. Overall Senate Assessment
Within the Senate, the parochial hypothesis that members will support
local defense expenditures in the form of jobs to satisfy the perceived demand
from their constituents was not borne out by any of the multivariate analyses. The
only time employment was significant was during the bivariate test for the SAC
and involved only 28 (28%) of the entire Senate. Its failure to re-emerge under
multivariate logit testing makes the applicability of its bivariate significance
questionable.
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The MIC hypothesis fares just as poorly, with TTL PAC never achieving
statistical significance when the dependent variable was support. On only one
occasion did TTL pac come close (p = 0.0505) and that was when logit equation
1 was run for entire Senate with the exception of the Southern Democrats. Since
membership in the TTC was not a result of the influence of the MIC, this
hypothesis clearly lacks applicability in the Senate.
The last remaining explanation is personal preference. It is not,
however, as powerful a predictor of support for the V-22 as past studies which
have used the NSI rating appear to indicate. Within the Senate NSI was positively
correlated with support in most cases, however, it rarely achieved statistical
significance. One possible reason is the waning effectiveness of this and other
similar scales of predicting congressional defense voting behavior.
If membership in the TTC is an extension of personal policy as argued,
then the personal preference hypothesis achieves a great deal of significance and
serves as a powerful predictor for determining support for the V-22 program. Yet,
because of the V-22 specific nature of this measure of personal preference, no
general statements about the overall predictive power of the personal preference
hypothesis are possible.
Finally, membership on the SAC Defense subcommittee and its
significance in predicting support can be viewed as a confluence of geographic
good fortune and presence on a committee that allows the members to pursue
their personal policy goals. States such as Texas, Pennsylvania, New York, and
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New Jersey are home to many firms in the aerospace industry. That some
subcontractor in their state would be awarded V-22 related work is not all that
unusual.
As detailed in Chapter II, many members seek positions on committees
and subcommittees for reasons such as constituency service or policy pursuit. As
a product of the state which he or she represents, the senator will more than
likely be an accurate reflection of his or her electoral constituency. For example,
if defense issues are important to the constituents that elected the senator, it is
likely that he or she personally believes in a strong defense. As such, membership
on one of the military committees may represent the best solution to satisfying
constituency demands while pursuing personal policy goals.
At the bivariate level, however, it is clear that a strong and significant
relationship exists between employment measured at the nominal level (JOBSn )
and support for the V-22. That this relationship did not repeat under multivariate
conditions (Table 5.16) highlights the importance of examining all of the factors
influencing a member's decision to support the V-22 as opposed to only one
variable. Had this not been the done, an incorrect conclusion could have been
reached.
Overall, data obtained from the 102nd Senate did not clearly support
any of the three major hypotheses. Only weak support for the personal preference
hypothesis was indicated via the variable NSI. Thus, the logit model presented in
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Chapter IV fails to accurately account for what (if any one factor) motivated
Senators to support the continuation of the V-22.
G. FINDINGS: 102nd HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1991-92)
The focus of this study now turns to an examination of the House of
Representatives. Will the logit model be more successful among House members?
Will parochial pressures be more evident among House members given their
narrower constituency? Will PAC contributions be more important given the
increased frequency of costly reelection campaigns as a result of the member's
two year terms? Or will personal preference prove to be the power predictor as
noted in previous literature?
1. The House
a. House Bivariate Analysis
The bivariate relationships between support for the V-22 and the
full House, House Armed Services Committee (HASC), and the House
Appropriations Committee (HAC) can be found in Appendix J.
Statistically significant events detected by this bivariate analysis in
the House (Table J.l) were the member's National Security Index or nsi (p =
0.0270) and membership in the Tiltrotor Technology Coalition or TTC (p = 0.0000).
Campaign contributions from the BOEING PAC (p = 0.0003) and TEXTRON PAC (p =
0.0000) were in their own right significant as was the resultant variable of Total
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PAC or TTL PAC (p = 0.0000). Being a former member of the U.S. Marine Corps
or FMR. USMC (p = 0.00001) was also a significant event.
Membership on the hasc {p = 0.0000) and its subcommittees of
Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems or proc (p = 0.0004), Research and
Development or R & D (p = 0.0121), Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials
or SPWR (p = 0.0013), and Readiness or rdns (p = 0.0004) all proved to be
significant events. Membership on the HAC subcommittee for Defense or DEF (p
= 0.0114) was the final significant event in the bivariate analysis of the entire
House.
Within the House, NSI was significant but the direction of the
relationship with support was not as anticipated. The parameter estimate (-
0.0057935) indicated that as a member's NSI rating increased, the probability of
that member supporting the V-22 decreased. This may have been caused by the
144 Democrats (66%) that signed the letter of support. The average NSI rating for
these representatives was 41 which was below the average NSI of 54 for the entire
House. The average NSI score for the 74 Republican members (34%) that signed
the letter was 92 and is above the average NSI score for the entire House. The
sheer number of Democrats, however, skewed the direction of the relationship
between support and NSI. This phenomenon remained consistent in all cases
whether at the House level or committee level (entire population).
The variable TTC was strongly significant for the House. Of the 126
members, 112 (89%) signed the 22 September 1992 letter of support for the V-22
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to President Bush. This degree of support exceeded the random chance occurrence
of this event. Just as in the earlier analyses involving the Senate, TTC continued
to be a significant variable in many of the following multivariate analyses and
was consistent in its anticipated positive relationship with SUPPORT.
The Boeing PAC and Textron PAC contributions were significant
both when viewed in isolation and when examined in the aggregate as
represented by TTL PAC. The direction was as predicted in the case of the Boeing
PAC but was negative for both the Textron PAC and for TTL PAC. The
circumstances that affected the direction of the relationship between nsi and
SUPPORT also affected the directional relationships between SUPPORT and TEXTRON
PAC and TTL PAC.
The variable fmr. usmc was significant because of the 20
Representatives that were in the U.S. Marine Corps, 18 (90%) of them signed the
letter supporting the V-22 Osprey. This high rate of support far exceeded what
random chance alone would have produced.
Membership on the HASC and its V-22 germane subcommittees
proc, R&D, spwr, and rdns was a very significant statistical event. Of the 54
representatives of the HASC, 44 members (82%) were signatories to the letter
advocating continuation of the V-22 program. This large percentage is greater
than that achieved by chance alone. For the proc subcommittee, 18 of the 21
members (86%) signed the letter.3 Of the 21 members assigned to the R&D
subcommittee, 16 members initialed the letter of support. For the members of the
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SPWR, 14 of the 16 members (87%) signed the letter supporting the V-22. The final
HASC subcommittee considered, RDNS, yielded 13 of the 14 members (93%) as
signatories to the V-22 letter of support.
The last significant event in the House
—
just as in the case of the
Senate—was membership on the HAC def subcommittee. Of the 13
representatives on this subcommittee, 10 (77%) indicated support for the V-22
program.
b. House Multivariate Analyses
The three logit equations detailed in the previous chapter were run
for the full House and with a control for political party affiliation. The detailed
results of the first logit equation are shown below in Table 5.17. The results of the
second logit equation which incorporates membership on the HASC or HAC and
the third logit equation which tests for the significance of membership on V-22
cognizant HASC or HAC subcommittees can be found in Appendix B. As was the
case in the Senate, iterations for both the interval measurement of employment
(jobs,) and the nominal measurement of employment (jobsn ) were conducted.
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TABLE 5.17: LOGIT EQUATION 1 - HOUSE (JOBS,)

















































p values in parentheses
unstable data
Multicollinearity between NSI and PS within the House and among Democrats.
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TABLE 5.18: LOGIT EQUATION 1 - HOUSE (JOBSN )















































p values in parentheses
unstable data
Multicollinearity between NSI and PS within the House and among Democrats.
According to the parochial hypothesis, one would expect the
presence of V-22 related employment to be a significant predictor of support for
the program. Yet logit equation 1 found no statistically significant relationship
between support and jobs,. When the smaller sample size generated by jobsI
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was used, the direction of the relationship was opposite of what the parochial
imperative would predict (i.e., a positive relationship between support and jobs).
However, when JOBSN was used to measure assumed V-22
employment benefits, the variable became statistically significant. Thus it would
appear the parochial imperative hypothesis is supported when the larger sample
size provided by JOBSN was used in logit equation 1. The significance of JOBSN
ceased among the two subpopulations. The directional relationship between
support and JOBSN was positive across all cases as predicted by the parochial
explanation for congressional voting on defense.
The MIC proponents would expect to see a positive and statistically
significant relationship between support and ttl PAC if the votes-for-dollars
hypothesis was correct. The data contained in Tables 5.17 and 5.18 only partially
supported this prediction when the entire House was examined via logit equation
1. While its statistical significance was an interesting discovery, the direction of
the relationship was not as expected. The negative relationship between ttl pac
and SUPPORT contradicted the generally positive relationship between these two
variables in the Senate. This directional relationship repeated for the
subpopulations of Democrats and Republicans and weakened applicability of the
MIC hypothesis to the House.
The personal preference hypothesis holds that the relationship
between SUPPORT and NSI should be positive in direction and statistically
significant. While the data obtained via logit equation 1 found NSI to be
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significant within the entire House and among House Democrats, the direction
of the relationship between support and nsi was negative. The data, however,
did not support the assumptions of the personal preference hypothesis. While it
correctly predicted the significance of ideology—as measured by NSI—it failed to
accurately predict the negative (or inverse) relationship between SUPPORT and
NSI.4
TTC, a secondary and V-22 unique measure of personal preference,
was statistically significant in both iterations of logit equation 1 for the House and
for the Democrat and Republican subpopulations. The direction of the relationship
between TTC and support was as anticipated (i.e., positive) in all cases.
FMR. USMC, another secondary indicator of personal preference,
proved to be significant in both variations of logit equation 1 only in the case of
the entire House. The positive directional relationship was as expected (i.e., that
a former member of the U.S. Marine Corps would support a primarily USMC
program such as the V-22).
party also proved to be significant in the case of the entire House
for both iterations of logit equation 1. The relationship between support and
PARTY was negative due to the largely Democratic V-22 support coalition (144
Democrats or 66% and 74 Republicans or 34%).
Logit equation 2 (Tables K.l and K.2) added the variable
COMMITTEE to see if membership on the House Armed Services Committee
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(HASC) or House Appropriations Committee (HAC) was a significant predictor
of behavior on the V-22.
As in logit equation 1, support for the parochial theory was mixed
depending on how V-22 employment benefits were measured. The directional
relationships remained the same. Lack of support for the MIC hypothesis
continued and the negative directional relationship was seen in all instances when
jobs, was used to measure V-22 direct employment benefits. As in logit equation
1, JOBSN was significant only for the entire House and the positive relationship
between SUPPORT and JOBSN this relationship continued for all cases.
The significance of TTL PAC ceased when logit equation 2 was used
to predict support for the V-22 program. This casts some doubt on the strength
of the main tenet of the MIC hypothesis. The negative directional relationship
between support and TTL PAC remained unchanged.
The significance of NSI continued for both variants of logit equation
2 in the case of the entire House and for the subpopulation of House Democrats.
The directional relationships displayed in Tables 5.17 and 5.18 were repeated.
Just as in logit equation 1, TTC remained a significant variable in
the full House and for both Democrat and Republican subpopulations regardless
of the measure of employment benefits utilized.
FMR. usmc, continued to be significant in both iterations of logit
equation 2 but, as in logit equation 1, was only so when the entire House was
examined. The positive directional relationship was repeated.
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party also proved to be significant in the case of the entire House
for both iterations of logit equation 2. The relationship between support and
PARTY continued in the negative direction.
Membership on the HASC proved to be significant when JOBSN was
utilized in logit equation 2 for both the entire House and for House Democrats.
Even in those cases where the variable did not prove to be statistically significant,
the directional relationship between hasc and SUPPORT was positive.
Logit equation 3 (Tables K.3 and K.4) replaced the variable
COMMITTEE with the variable subcommittee to determine if membership on the
relevant HASC or HAC subcommittees was a significant predictor of behavior on
the V-22.
Iterations of logit equation 3 yielded no change in statistically
significant events or the directional relationships determined via logit equation 2.
Membership on the HASC and HAC subcommittees which was so
significant in the bivariate analysis of the House failed to emerge in the
multivariate analysis calculations of logit equation 3. None of the subcommittee
variables even approached significance {p<-05) and the directional relationships
were generally positive as anticipated. Some of the relationships were negative,
however, no clear pattern was detected.
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2. The House Armed Services Committee (HASC)
a. HASC Bivariate Analysis
The significant events in the HASC bivariate analysis were jobs
measured at the nominal level or JOBSN (represented by SUB.VNDR.) with a value
of p = 0.0175, political party affiliation or PARTY (p = 0.0267), membership in the
TTC {p = 0.0004), and a member's Presidential Support rating or PS (p = 0.0293).
Bivariate analysis at the committee level for the members of the
HASC (Table J.2) found that JOBSN was statistically significant. Of the 54 HASC
members, 12 representatives (22%) had a prime contractor or subcontractor that
were assumed to provide V-22 related jobs. All of these 12 members (100%)
signed the letter of support for the V-22. Of the remaining 42 members without
V-22 related employment benefits for their constituents, 32 (76°/.) still indicated
support for the program by signing the letter to President Bush.
A member's political party affiliation was also significant within
the HASC. Of the 21 Republican members (Avg. NSI = 97)—Rep. Blaz was not
included—on the committee, 14 (67% - avg. NSI = 96) signed the letter of support.
This figure is greater than that of pure chance (i.e., 50%) and not too surprising
as it was assumed and true that Republicans were more pro-defense or "hawkish"
than their Democratic counterparts as indicated by the NSI scores. It is among the
33 Democrats on the HASC (Avg. NSI = 49) that the significance of PARTY
becomes apparent. 30 (91%) of the HASC Democrats (Avg. NSI = 50) signed the
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letter of support for the V-22. Since it was assumed that Democrats were more
"dovish" on defense, this finding was significant.
Closely tied to this finding was the significance of PS among
members of the HASC. It was assumed that the president has a certain degree of
influence over defense issues and, as such, a member's PS rating might provide
some insight into potential behavior on an issue. As noted in Chapter in, the Bush
Administration lobbied hard against the continuation of the V-22 Osprey.
It was anticipated that members with a high PS rating would
endorse the president's position and not lend their support to the V-22 program.
Yet the findings (parameter estimate = 0.04515711) did not support this
assumption. The event was statistically significant but the direction of the
relationship between PS and support was opposite of what one would expect.
Member's with a high PS rating should oppose the continuation of the V-22
program. This was not the case and as a member's PS rating increased, the
probability of that member going against the president's position also increased.
At the defense committee level, the influence of the Executive appears to be
limited.
The final statistically significant event for the HASC was TTC. Of
the 54 total members, 23 are members of the TTC and all 23 (100%) signed the
letter urging President Bush to continue the V-22 program. Of the 31 remaining
non-TTC members of the HASC, 21 (68%) were signatories to the V-22 support
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letter. Both of these percentage rates exceed what would be expected from pure
chance.
b. HASC Multivariate Analyses
The results of logit equation 1 are shown in Tables 5.19 and 5.20
while those of logit equation 3 are found in Appendix L.
TABLE 5.19: LOGIT EQUATION 1 - HASC (JOBS,)
















































p values in parentheses
* #
unstable data zeroed data
Multicollinearity between NSI and PS and JOBS, and FMR. USMC.
biased data
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TABLE 5.20: LOGIT EQUATION 1 - HASC (JOBSn )

















































p values in parentheses
*
unstable data
Multicollinearity between NSI and PS and jOBSj and FMR. USMC.
The relationship between jobs and support for the V-22 did not
emerge under multivariate conditions at the committee level of analysis. The
significance of JOBSN detected under bivariate conditions was not repeated when
logit equation 1 was applied to the HASC membership. The power of the
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parochial hypothesis as an adequate explanation for institutional behavior on
defense voting was absent from the HASC committee findings. While the
direction of the relationship between support and JOBS was positive, any
conclusions drawn from this data must be viewed caution as all six parameter
estimates were evaluated as unstable.
The significance of the main indicator of the MIC hypothesis, TTL
pac ceased when the full HASC was evaluated via logit equation 1. The negative
relationship between support and TTL pac continued through both iterations of
logit equation 1 for the entire HASC and for HASC Democrats but was reversed
in the case of HASC Republicans. Again, much of the data was evaluated as
unstable and any observations must be made with caution. As was the case with
the parochial hypothesis, support for the MIC proponents failed to appear in the
examination of the HASC via logit equation 1.
The primary measure of personal preference, NSI, lost its statistical
significance as did the other secondary indicators of personal preference
—
ttc and
fmr. usmc—when the population was restricted to only HASC members. NSI and
support exhibited a consistent negative relationship for both iterations of logit
equation 1 while positive relationships emerged when the two subpopulations
were examined.
TTC maintained a steady positive relationship to support as did
FMR. usmc with the exception of the Republican subpopulation when JOBSn was
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used to measure employment benefits. Again, the data was unstable in almost
every instance.
PARTY also lost its statistical significance as the scope of the
analysis narrowed to the HASC. While the negative relationship that was detected
in the full House was repeated, the parameter estimates were very large and
classified as unstable.
Analysis of the HASC via logit equation 3 failed to yield any
statistically significant events. The relationship between JOBS and support was
mixed. The negative relationship between TTL PAC and SUPPORT for all cases
continued through both iterations of logit equation 3. The relationship between
NSI and support was negative in all cases through both iterations of logit
equation 3 with the exception of the Republican subpopulation when JOBS, was
used to measure employment benefits.
The relationships between ttc and fmr. usmc and support
continued as in logit equation 1. The negative relationship between party and
SUPPORT was reversed as the measure of employment benefits shifted from jobsl
to JOBSN . All data was unstable.
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3. The House Appropriations Committee (HAC)
a. HAC Bivariate Analysis
The HAC bivariate analysis (Table J.3) indicated NSI (p = 0.0342),
TTC (p = 0.0000), BOEING PAC (p = 0.0162), TEXTRON PAC (p = 0.0181) and TTL PAC
(p = 0.0105) as significant events.
The bivariate analysis of the HAC found that NSI repeated as a
significant event. As in the House, the direction of the relationship between NSI
and support was negative (parameter estimate = -0.0148801). This is contrary to
the initial assumption that members with high NSI ratings would favor the
continuation of the V-22 program. For example, the probability of HAC members
with an NSI of 100 (the highest score possible) supporting the V-22 was only 33
percent.
Membership in the TTC also proved to be a significant event. Of the
59 members of the HAC, 20 representatives were affiliated with the TTC. Of these
20 ttc members, 18 (90%) signed the letter supporting the V-22.
Campaign contributions by the two prime contractors—whether
viewed in isolation or in the aggregate (TTL PAC)—were the final significant
events in the bivariate analysis of the HAC. The directional relationships for all
three events were negative which is the opposite of what was predicted by the
Military-Industrial Complex (MIC) proponents that believe money "buys" support.
The data, however, found the opposite to be true. As the amount of money
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received increased, the probability of a member supporting the V-22 decreased.
For example, as Boeing PAC receipts increased from $1000 to $3500, the
probability of support dropped from 40% to approximately 10%.
b. HAC Multivariate Analyses
The parameter estimates from logit equation 1 are listed below in
Tables 5.21 and 5.22. The data from the logit equation 3 is provided in Appendix
M.
Logit equation 1 employed at the committee level found two events
of three statistically significant events detected via bivariate analysis—NSI and
TTC—to be present under multivariate conditions.
Although not significant, the consistent positive relationship
between SUPPORT and JOBSN was in accordance with the directional behavior
predicted by the parochial hypothesis. The directional relationship when jobs,
was used to measure employment benefits negative for both the HAC and HAC
Democratic subpopulation. The strength of the parochial imperative continued to
weaken from its initial strong showing in the full House.
The relationship between support and ttl pac continued to be
negative in all cases across both iterations of logit equation 1. The data at this
level failed to support the main tenet of the MIC hypothesis.
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TABLE 5.21: LOGIT EQUATION 1 - HAC (JOBS,)











































p values in parentheses No usmc base presence
it-
unstable data
Multicollinearity between NSI and PS for the HAC and HAC Democrats.
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TABLE 5.22: LOGIT EQUATION 1 - HAC (JOBSn )
















































p values in parentheses
»
unstable data
Multicollinearity between NSI and PS for the HAC and HAC Democrats.
NSI achieved statistical significance when JOBS, was used in logit
equation 1 in the case of HAC Democrats (NSI was very close to significance in
the HAC p = 0.0519). When JOBSN was utilized, the significance of NSI spread to
the entire HAC. The directional relationship between support and NSI was
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negative in all significant cases and negative for non-significant cases with the
exception of HAC Republicans when jobs, is utilized. The personal preference
explanation for congressional voting behavior on defense issues is strengthened
by these findings.
Further reinforcing the personal preference explanation is the
statistical significance of TTC for the HAC in the case of JOBS, utilization and for
the full HAC and HAC Democrats when JOBSN is utilized in logit equation 1. The
relationship between TTC and support is positive in all cases through both
iterations of logit equation 1.
Data obtained from logit equation 3 yielded the same significant
events. However, the absolute number of cases in which they appeared decreased.
NSI was found to be significant only when JOBSN was used in logit
equation 3. The directional relationship between NSI and support continued as
in logit equation 1.
TTC significance pattern continued as in logit equation 1. The
relationship between TTC and SUPPORT is positive in all cases through both
iterations of logit equation 3.
4. 102nd House Subpopulations
Several major subpopulation variants were conducted utilizing the full
Senate while controlling for geographic region, such as being a Democrat from the
South or a member of the TTC. Analysis was also conducted at the SAC Defense
subcommittee level. Finally, the possible motivations for becoming a member of
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the TTC were explored by replacing the dependent variable support with ttc
and utilizing the framework delineated in logit equation 1.
a. Geographic Regions
As with the Senate, the House was divided up into eight
geographic regions to detect any statistically significant events that may have
been "masked" by the presence of any one region or diluted by the presence of
the rest of the nation. Tables 5.23 and 5.24 list only statistically significant events
and provide the direction (+/-) of the relationship with SUPPORT. Full data tables
for each variation can be found in Appendix N.
TABLE 5.23: REGIONAL COMPARISONS (JOBS^
REGION JOBSj BASE NSI PARTY TTC TTLPAC FMR.
Border - - + - +
EN Cent - - + +
Mid-Atl - - + - +
Mtn - - +
N.East - - + +
Pacific - - + +
South - - + - +
WN Cent - - +
.
+
BASE: USMC BASE FMR.: FMR. USMC
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TABLE 5.24: REGIONAL COMPARISONS (JOBSn )
REGION JOBSN BASE NSI PARTY TTC TTLPAC FMR.
Border + - - + +
EN Cent - - + +
Mid-Atl - - + - +
Mtn - - + -
N. East + - - + - +
Pacific - - + +
South - - + +
WN Cent + - - + - +
BASE: USMC BASE FMR.: FMR. USMC
As made clear by Table 5.23, the regional exclusion variations
examined via logit equation 1 and jobsl found no support for the parochial
hypothesis. Even when JOBSN was used (Table 5.24), only three regions found a
significant and positive relationship between the nominal level of employment,
jobsn , and support.
The primary indicator of the MIC, TTL pac, was only found
consistently in the Mid-Atlantic and Southern regional exclusion variations. The
relationship of SUPPORT and TTL PAC was negative in both statistically significant
instances and in all other cases.
The presence of the primary index of the personal preference
hypothesis, NSI, was present in every case regardless of whether JOBS, or JOBSN
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was used in logit equation 1. It directional relationship, as noted in earlier
findings continued to be negative.
The uniquely V-22 indicator of personal preference, TTC, was
present and significant in every case of the regional exclusions. Its direction
indicated a positive relationship with support.
The variable FMR. USMC is present and statistically significant in all
of the eight regional variations with the exception of the one involving the
Mountain region. As with TTC, the relationship between SUPPORT and FMR. USMC
was positive.
Also present and significant in every case was PARTY. Like NSI, its
relationship with support continued to be negative.
Tables N.9 and N.10 provide the same type of information on each
individual region. Unlike the exclusion variations, there were only 11 significant
events. NSI was involved in two (1 region), PARTY in four (2 regions) and TTC in
five cases (4 regions).
Neither the parochial or MIC explanations were supported by the
individual regional data.
b. Southern Democrat Analysis
The full House was examined to control for the influence of the
"Dixiecrats." As previously noted, Southern Democrats are often more "hawkish"
than other Democrats and tend to be pro-defense. In the 102nd House, the average
NSI rating for the Southern Democrats was 61 while the remaining Democrats
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averaged 20. Logit equations 1, 2, and 3 were utilized to determine if any
statistically significant events were present that examinations of the full House
may have missed due to the presence of the "hawkish" Southern Democrats. The
findings of logit equation 1 are given in Tables 5.25 and 5.26. Appendix N
contains the results of logit equations 2 and 3.
The parochial hypothesis was again thwarted as neither JOBSj or
jobsn achieved significance. The directional relationship patterns were mixed.
Positive relationships were exhibited across all three cases when JOBSN was
utilized in logit equation 1. The direction of this positive relationship shifted when
Southern Democrats were excluded and when Southern Democrats were
examined in isolation while using jobs,.
The statistical significance of TTL pac in the case of Southern
Democrats being excluded from the rest of the House was consistent through both
iterations of logit equation 1. This finding may add some credence to the beliefs
of the MIC proponents. The relationship between TTL PAC and SUPPORT was
negative in the significant case and in the case of non-southern Democrats
regardless of the employment measurement used. The direction of this
relationship shifted in both cases for the Southern Democrats.
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TABLE 5.25: LOGIT EQUATION 1 - SOUTHERN DEMOCRATIC REPS. (JOBS.)
















































p values in parentheses
»
unstable data
Multicollinearity between NSI and PS for the exclusion of Non-Southern Democrats and
Southern Democrats.
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TABLE 5.26: LOGIT EQUATION 1
SOUTHERN DEMOCRATIC REPS. (JOBSn )


















































p values in parentheses
unstable data
Multicollinearity between NSI and PS for the exclusion of Non-Southern Democrats and
Southern Democrats.
The performance of the main personal preference indicator, NSI,
was significant in the case of the Southern Democrats being excluded from the
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rest of the House. This significance was repeated in the case of non-Southern
Democrats when JOBSN was used to measure employment benefits from the V-22.
The negative relationship between nsi and support was consistent across all
cases and through both iterations of logit equation 1.
TTC achieved significance in five of the six cases with the only
exception being Southern Democrats when JOBSj is used in logit equation 1. The
positive direction of the relationship with support was present in all cases
regardless of which measure of employment benefits were used.
Another secondary measure of the personal preference hypothesis,
fmr. usmc, gained significance in the case of the Southern Democrats being
excluded from the rest of the House. The positive relationship between support
and FMR. USMC was present in the significant and the other five cases examined
via logit equation 1.
One final variable that gained significance regardless of which
measure of employment was used was PARTY. As in previous instances, the
relationship with support was negative and not in the initially assumed direction.
Examination of this subpopulation within the House via logit
equations 2 and 3 found very similar results to those obtained under logit
equation 1. Once again, support for the parochial hypothesis was absent in all
cases.
In defiance of the applicability of the MIC hypothesis, ttl pac lost
statistical significance under logit equations 2 and 3. The nature of the
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relationship between TTL PAC and SUPPORT remained unchanged from logit
equation 1.
The primary index of the personal preference explanation for
congressional defense voting behavior, NSI, and the secondary indices of TTC and
FMR. USMC maintained their significance and directional relationships with
support through both iterations of logit equations 2 and 3. The variable FMR.
usmc actually gained significance in one case—Southern Democrats excluded
from the rest of the House—for both logit equations 2 and 3.
c. TTC Membership
Since the parameter TTC has been so significant in many of the
House models, the possibility existed of this event masking the influence of other
parameters such as jobs or TTL pac. To see if this was indeed the case,
membership in the TTC was controlled and logit equations 1, 2, and 3 run for
both members and non-members. Coincident with these calculations, the effect of
PARTY was investigated. The first sets of data, Tables 5.27 and 5.28, deal with
those representatives (126: 75D - 51R) that are members of the TTC. The
corresponding data for logit equations 2 and 3 can be found in Appendix O.
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TABLE 5.27: LOGIT EQUATION 1 - HOUSE TTC MEMBERS (JOBS,)









































p values in parentheses
*
unstable data
Multicollinearity between TTL PAC and JOBS, among Republicans
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TABLE 5.28: LOGIT EQUATION 1 - HOUSE TTC MEMBERS (JOBSn )







































p values in parentheses
*
unstable data
The evaluation of the TTC members of the Senate failed to yield
statistical significance for either measure of employment across equation 1. The
nature of the relationship between SUPPORT and JOBS! was negative for equation
1. This relationship was reversed when JOBSN was utilized in logit equation 1.
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The variable TTL PAC failed to achieve significance in support of the
MIC hypothesis exhibited mixed behavior across logit equation 1. The relationship
to support was positive only in the case of TTC Democrats.
The personal preference hypothesis failed to emerge as the
dominant explanation as nsi and other secondary indicators did not achieve
significance. The relationship between NSI and support for Republicans was
positive and but reversed its direction in the other cases. This pattern was
consistent through both iterations of logit equation 1.
The parochial hypothesis fared slightly better under logit equations
2 and 3. The positive relationship with SUPPORT was repeated for all cases when
JOBSN was used as the measure of V-22 related employment. Using this measure,
JOBSn actually achieved statistical significance when calculated via logit equation
3 (p = 0.0481). When JOBS, was used, no significance was detected and the
relationship with SUPPORT was generally negative in direction.
Neither the primary indicator of the MIC hypothesis, TTL PAC, or
the major indicator of the personal preference hypothesis, NSI, or any of the
secondary indicators—TTC or FMR. USMC—achieved statistical significance under
logit equations 2 or 3.
Committee and subcommittee membership did not attain statistical
significance via equations 2 and 3 respectively and directional relationships were
inconsistent.
181
The second set of data tables associated with controlling for the
influence of membership in the TTC were the calculations involving those
members of the House who had not joined the TTC. Tables 5.29 and 5.30 provide
the results of the calculations done via logit equation 1. The data for logit
equations 2 and 3 for non-TTC Representatives can be found in Appendix P.











































p values in parentheses
*
unstable data
Multicollinearity between PS and NSI for non-TTC Representatives and for non-TTC Democrats.
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L J R2 = 0.112269OBS. = 263 R2 = 0.164483OBS. = 165 R2 = 0.065834OBS. = 98
p values in parentheses
unstable data
Multieollinearity between PS and NSI for non-TTC Representatives and for non-TTC Democrats
The parochial hypothesis did not benefit from the exclusion of TTC
members. While the direction of the relationship with SUPPORT was positive in all
cases (with the exception of non-TTC Democrats when jobsl is used) and
consistent through all iterations of logit equation 1, at no time did either measure
of employment approach statistical significance.
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The MIC hypothesis fared much better under controlled conditions
for TTC membership. The multivariate analysis of logit equation 1 found ttl PAC
to be significant in both iterations for the case of non-TTC Democrats. When
JOBSn was used, TTL PAC gained significance for the entire House (minus the TTC
members). The directional relationship with SUPPORT was negative in all cases.
The personal preference hypothesis also found support under the
TTC membership controlled conditions. Under logit equation 1, nsi was
significant for both House non-TTC representatives and non-TTC Democrats. The
relationship between SUPPORT and nsi remained consistently negative across all
cases and iterations of logit equation 1.
A secondary measure of personal preference, FMR. usmc, was
significant for House non-TTC members when JOBSN was used in logit equation
1. The direction of the relationship to support was positive as expected for this
variable.
One additional variable achieving significance was PARTY under
both iterations of logit equation 1. In both cases, the relationship with SUPPORT
was negative.
Subsequent evaluations of this controlled data set via logit
equations 2 and 3 revealed similar significance and directional relationship
patterns for the variables NSI, FMR. usmc, and party. The statistical significance
of TTL PAC failed to repeat under the conditions of logit equations 2 and 3.
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Under logit equation 2, membership on the HASC was a significant
event (p = 0.0444 when jOBSj utilized and p = 0.0369 when JOBSN utilized) only
in the case on non-TTC Democrats. Its relationship with SUPPORT was positive in
this significant case.
Neither the HAC or any of the HASC and HAC related
subcommittees achieved statistical significance under logit equations 2 and 3
respectively.
Further exploration into the TTC led to the utilization of a variation
of logit equation 1 to search for events that may have statistical significance and
could explain why a member might join the TTC. Logit equation 5 is given below.
TTC = a, + b2 (Jobs) + b 3 (USMC Base) + b4 (ADA) + b 5 (NSI) + b6 (Party)
+ b8 (Pres.Support) + b„ (PAC) + b 10 (Fmr. USMC) + e
(Equation 5)
The results of this investigation are provided below in Tables 5.31 and 5.32.
The variable of JOBS continued to be statistically insignificant
although in the case of JOBSN it approached statistical significance {p = 0.0512). It
appears that employment-related reasons were not a suitable predictor for a
member to join the TTC. The directional relationship between support and jobs
was split. It was positive for the cases of JOBSN/ and negative for all cases using
JOBS,.
185
TABLE 5.31: LOGIT EQUATION 5 - HOUSE TTC INVESTIGATION (JOBS,)











































TABLE 5.32: LOGIT EQUATION 5 - HOUSE TTC INVESTIGATION (JOBSn )







































p values in parentheses
*
unstable data
With regard to the TTC being an outgrowth of the MIC, the
statistical significance of TTL PAC among all House members and House
Republicans when JOBSj was used and in all three cases utilizing JOBSN in
equation 4, appears to be convincing evidence of this phenomenon. The problem
lies in the negative relationship between being a member of the TTC and the
receipt of PAC money from the two prime contractors. As was the case earlier in
the Senate, the lack of PAC receipts was a significant predictor of a congressman
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joining the TTC! This data only further discredits the votes-for-dollars theorists.
If this assertion were true, then the relationship between PAC dollars and
membership in an organization such as the TTC should be positive not negative.
The TTC may represent a forum for members to pursue what see
believe is good policy. Through a structured organization, members of Congress
can efficiently work to develop tiltrotor technology whether they believe it makes
sound military sense or good long term economic sense.
Strong support for this interpretation of the ideological nature of
membership in the TTC was the statistical significance of nsi among Democrats
regardless of employment measure used and among the entire House when jobsn
was utilized in logit equation 5.
Lending additional credence to this interpretation of the TTC was
the significance of FMR. USMC—a secondary measure of personal preference—for
the entire House regardless of what measure of V-22 employment was used. The
direction of the relationship between FMR. USMC and SUPPORT was positive in all
cases through both iterations of logit equation 5.
5. Overall House Assessment
Within the House, the parochial hypothesis that members will support
local defense expenditures at the expense of other national interests was
supported by one of the bivariate and several of the multivariate studies
conducted for this body. While JOBSN was significant at the bivariate level of
analysis for the HASC, this finding should be viewed with some skepticism. If
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JOBSn was the only factor influencing a member's decision then the finding would
have merit.
The significance that JOBSN achieved within the full House for all three
logit equations supported the parochial assumption that members would support
the V-22 if a subcontractor was located in or near their district. In further support
of the parochial hypothesis was the fact that all three significant events for the full
House were positively related to support for the V-22. The fact that JOBSN was
both significant and positively related to support confirmed the predictions of the
parochial hypothesis.
The performance of the MIC hypothesis was mixed, ttl pac achieved
statistical significance in two of the bivariate analyses and in several of the
multivariate studies. For examples see Tables 5.17 and 5.18 or 5.29 and 5.30. In all
cases, however, the direction of the relationship was the opposite of what was
anticipated. Instead of being positively related to TTL pac, the relationship was
negative and indicated that as PAC contributions rose, the probability of a
member supporting the V-22 decreased.
The last remaining explanation is personal preference. It is primarily
represented by nsi, a powerful predictor and explanation of support on defense
as the previously cited studies in Chapter II indicated. Within the House, nsi
consistently achieved statistical significance. Similar to the directional relationship
experienced with both JOBSN and TTL PAC, NSI was inversely related to support.
In spite of its statistical significance, nsi fails to accurately explain a member's
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support for the V-22. Thus the personal preference hypothesis finds only limited
support among secondary indicators of this hypothesis.
One such indicator is FMR. USMC. As seen in Tables J.l, 5.17, and 5.18,
FMR. USMC is significant and positively related to support for the V-22 under both
bivariate and multivariate conditions. The commonly held belief that "there is no
such thing as a former Marine" certainly appears to be the case among those
members of the House that had served in the Marine Corps.
If membership in the TTC is an extension of personal policy, as
previously argued in the assessment of the Senate, then the personal preference
hypothesis achieves a great deal of significance. TTC serves as a powerful
predictor for determining support for the V-22 program in the House and in the
Senate.
Membership on any of the defense related committees or
subcommittees had very little significance to support for the V-22 Osprey in terms
of multivariate analyses. When evaluated on a bivariate basis, these committees
and subcommittees become very important.
One final variable that was significant in several of the analyses was
PARTY. Political party affiliation can be thought of as the broadest manifestation
of ideology. A member chooses to be a Republican or Democrat because of the
party's overall philosophy on the role and purpose of the federal government and
approach to domestic and international issues. Because various
subpopulations—such as pro-defense Democrats—can exist within this large a
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group, its usefulness an a consistent predictor is limited and thus is treated
separately from personal preference.
Overall, data obtained from the 102nd House provided strong support
for the parochial hypothesis when the nominal level of employment, jobsN, was
used in the examination of the full House via all three logit equations. Thus far,
this has been the only situation in which a variable has achieved statistical
significance and was positively correlated with SUPPORT for the V-22 within the
entire House or Senate.
The data provided no support for the MIC hypothesis. Even though
TTL PAC was significant in many instances, its relationship to support was the
opposite of the anticipated direction.
The personal preference hypothesis was not fully supported by its
primary indicator. Although some support was found among secondary
indicators, they are too specific to the V-22 (a primarily U.S Marine Corps
program or tiltrotor technology) to be applied to other case studies. As in the
Senate, the "classic" explanations for congressional behavior on defense issues
found no support within the House.
D. FINDINGS FROM THE HASC PROCUREMENT SUBCOMMITTEE
MARKUP - FY90
As detailed in Chapter in, the summer of 1989 was a critical point in the V-
22 program. It was during the June 1989 mark-up session for the House version
of the FY 90 Defense Authorization bill that Rep. Les Aspin (D-WI) successfully
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led a Republican dominated coalition over subcommittee Democrats in an effort
to restore the procurement section of the revised Executive budget submission
thus eliminating funds for the V-22.
1. Bivariate Analysis
A simple bivariate analysis of this vote found PARTY (p = 0.0066) and
PS (p = 0.0293) to be significant events for this subcommittee vote.
PARTY was significant because of the eight Republicans on the 101 st
PROC subcommittee, seven (87%) voted against increased defense spending which
would have funded the V-22. This went against the general assumption that
Republicans favor higher defense spending. Of the eleven Democrats, eight (73%)
voted to restore funding to the Osprey. This also went against the conventional
wisdom that Democrats were "dovish" on defense.
The strength of a popular president was seen in the significance
between voting to restore the executive's revised procurement budget request and
the PS rating. President Bush had recently entered office and his popularity was
strong enough to convince a sufficient number of Democrats to vote in favor of
his proposal for procurement which did not include the V-22.
2. Multivariate Analyses
Table 5.33 provides the results of the analysis of this vote under the
multivariate conditions of logit equation 4.
192
The results of the multivariate analysis in this case are inconclusive as
the data is unstable. None of the major explanations for congressional behavior
can be supported or refuted in this instance. Perhaps the best indicator was PARTY
as the vote essentially went along political party lines in favor of the new
Republican president.
TABLE 5.33: LOGIT EQUATION 4 - PROCUREMENT FY90 MARK-UP (JOBSN )
p values in parentheses
unstable data













































ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER V.
1. The study cited in Chapter II was Douglas Nelson and Eugene Silberg,
"Ideology and Legislator Shirking," Economic Inquiry, Vol. 25, No. 1 (January
1987), pp. 15-25. The critique of this study can be found in James Lindsay,
Congress and Nuclear Weapons (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press,
1991), p. 127.
2. For more on the problems of ecological fallacy, see Jarol B. Manheim and
Richard C. Rich, Empirical Political Analysis: Research Methods in Political
Science, 3rd ed., (New York: Longman Publishing Group, 1991), pp. 197-8.
3. Rep. Ben Blaz (R - Guam) was not included in the calculation for the House
as he does not vote on the floor. He was, however, a signatory to the 22
September letter which would have made the findings even more significant
with 19 of 22 members (86%) indicating support for the program.
4. It was noted early on in this chapter that the ADA rating was inversely
collinear with the NSI score. If the ADA rating would have been used, the
relationship with SUPPORT would have been positive and the related events
statistically significant. However, utilization of the ADA rating would have
not been in keeping with the personal preference hypothesis as members




The findings of this study of congressional support for the V-22 Osprey
aircraft did not fully support any of the three proposed explanations for
institutional behavior on defense issues. At the same time, however, this study
allowed for a side-by-side comparison of both chambers of the legislature on a
controversial, multi-billion dollar weapon system. What differences or similarities
were detected as a result of the analyses conducted on the Senate and House?
A. SENATE AND HOUSE COMPARISONS
The following section compares the Senate and House findings as they relate
to the three major explanations
—
parochialism, Military-Industrial Complex (MIC),
and personal preference—for congressional behavior on defense issues.
1. Parochial Hypothesis
The first explanation for institutional—not individual—behavior on
support for defense issues such as the V-22 was parochialism. Parochialism was
defined in Chapter II as an excessive preoccupation with the local impact of
spending decisions at the expense of the national interest. The parochial
hypothesis predicted that those members with prime contractors or first tier
subcontractors in their state (for senators) or district (for representatives) would
support the continuation of the V-22 because of the economic benefits it provided
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to their respective state or district. As such, the bivariate and multivariate
analyses should detect statistically significant and positive relationships between
employment (jobs) and support for the V-22.
The bivariate analyses for the Senate and the House both detected a
significant relationship between JOBS and support for the Senate Appropriations
Committee (SAC) and the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) when the
nominal measurement of employment (jobsn ) was utilized. Only at the committee
level was a relationship between JOBSN and support present.
The multivariate analyses for the Senate found no statistically
significant relationship between jobs (regardless of whether the interval or
nominal measure of employment was used) and support. Additionally, among
Senate Democrats, the relationship to employment was consistently negative. This
observation clearly contradicted the anticipated relationship between jobs and
SUPPORT according to the parochial hypothesis.
The multivariate analyses for the House, on the other hand, found a
different situation. When the less descriptive measure of ]OBSN was used, the
nominal measure of employment achieved significance in the full House for logit
equations 1, 2, and 3. Also in support of the parochial hypothesis the directional
relationship with support was positive in every case when JOBSN achieved
significance. In those case where JOBSN was not significant, the relationship to
support remained positive in almost every case.
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As noted in Chapter II, constituents do not hold their senators strictly
accountable for their voting actions unless they stray too far from the constituency
mainstream. Unfortunately no equivalent study for representatives was found.
Given the significance of the possibility of V-22 direct employment within a
representative's district, perhaps members of the House did more than "think
about constituent economic level consequences" when they decided to lend their
support to the V-22. 1 Perhaps just the knowledge of a V-22 subcontractor in their
district (or very close to their district borders) was enough to sway a member to
support the program. Of all the primary indicators, only JOBSN satisfied the two
criteria of statistical significance and proper relationship (i.e., a positive
relationship) to support for the V-22.
The influence of employment benefits was reversed between the Senate
and the House. Senators appear to be "free in the harness" and not constrained
by economic benefits measured at the state-wide level. Representatives, however,
appeared more responsive to parochial pressures. This may be due to the
narrower constituencies that representatives have to draw upon for support and
continued service in the House. The two year reelection cycle, where past
"transgressions" against district interests could resurface more quickly, may also
be a constraint on a representative's freedom to act according to their own policy
views.
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2. Military-Industrial Complex Hypothesis
The Military-Industrial Complex hypothesis held that Political Action
Committee (PAC) contributions to a member would seal support for that
company's defense project or opposition to any competitors. The primary variable
for this explanation of congressional behavior was total PAC contributions made
to a senator or representative. If this hypothesis is correct, it was predicted that
as contributions from the Boeing PAC and Textron PAC to a member increased,
the probability of that member supporting the V-22 would correspondingly
increase. This positive relationship would also be a statistically significant event.
Was this assumption supported by the evidence in Chapter V for the Senate and
House?
The bivariate analyses for the Senate did not detect any significant
relationship between total PAC contributions (TTL PAC) and support for the V-22.
In the House, however, the bivariate analysis found statistically significant
relationships at both the full House level and committee (House Appropriations
Committee - HAC) level of analysis. In both of these cases, however, the direction
of the relationship was negative. In other words, as PAC dollar amounts
increased, the probability of a member supporting the V-22 decreased. This
contradicted the MIC hypothesis at the bivariate level.
When multivariate analysis was used, only one case (p = 0.0505) in the
Senate was found to be close to meeting the criteria of statistical significance (<
0.05) used in this study.2 This case was positively related—as were the majority
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of non-significant cases—to support for the V-22 program and seemed to lend, at
best, limited support for the MIC hypothesis. Because the logit equation excluded
Southern Democrats, this finding was not applicable to the full Senate and thus
the MIC hypothesis found no support in the Senate.
Once again, the House displayed the exact opposite picture. TTL PAC
achieved statistical significance on a number of occasions and at various levels of
analysis. The relationship to support, however, was the opposite of the anticipated
positive correlation. All significant events between TTL PAC and support were
inversely related. As PAC contributions rose, the probability of support for the
V-22 fell. This situation contradicted the main tenet of the MIC hypothesis and,
just as in the Senate, no support for proponents of this explanation for
congressional behavior was detected in the study of the V-22.
While there were differences of frequency of statistical significance
(greater in the House) and shifts in the directional relationship between chambers,
the end result was that the MIC hypothesis was not supported in either chamber.
3. Personal Preference Hypothesis
The final hypothesis, personal preference, held that a member would
choose to support or oppose a defense issue based on her or his own personal
beliefs and attitudes. This hypothesis is most prevalent in the absence of clearly
defined constituency constraints such as the presence of a prime contractor. The
primary indicator for this explanation of congressional behavior was the National
Security Index (nsi) and members with high scores were assumed to be pro-
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defense or "hawkish" than those with low scores. 3 Was this institutional behavior
in accordance with this hypothesis the reason for Senate and House continuation
of the V-22 program?
The bivariate analyses of the Senate and House found no significant
relationships between NSI and support for the V-22.
The multivariate analyses for the Senate found NSI to be significant and
positively correlated only among Republicans in the Senate (Tables 5.1, B.l, B.3,
and B.4). Since the finding that NSI is significant and positively correlated with
support for the V-22 is select cases among Republicans only represents only one
subpopulation within the Senate, any general conclusions about overall Senate
behavior was not possible. The failure of NSI to repeat in this fashion among the
various subpopulations examined in the Senate detracts even further from the
universality of this rather limited finding. In light of these findings, no solid
support for the personal preference hypothesis was found within the Senate in the
case of the V-22.
The situation in the House was no better. While NSI achieved statistical
significance in a number of cases (Tables 5.17, 5.18, 5.21, and 5.23 to name a few),
the relationship to support for the V-22 was wrong. In all significant cases, the
relationship between NSI and support was negative. This contradicted the
assumption of the personal preference hypothesis that members with higher NSI
scores would be more likely to support the V-22. The data showed this not to be
the case and, as such, the personal preference hypothesis was discredited as an
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accurate explanation for behavior within the House regarding the continuation of
the V-22.
The differences between the Senate and House with regard to the
personal preference hypothesis were ones of frequency of significance (greater in
the House) and direction of the relationship between nsi and support (positive
in the Senate, negative in the House). The end result, however, was the
same—data from each chamber failed to support the personal preference
hypothesis.
B. METHODOLOGICAL LESSONS LEARNED
This section describes problems associated with the methodology involved
in studies of this nature. It addresses problems related to the dependent variable
and the associated independent variables.
1. Dependent Variable
As noted in Chapter IV, no roll call votes for this controversial issue
were available in either the Senate or the House. A member's support for the V-22
was determined by examining signatures on letters from the Senate (4 June 1992)
and House of Representatives (22 September 1992) to President Bush urging
continuation of the V-22.
The question then becomes one of how "binding" that member's
signature becomes should the V-22 come up for a vote on the Senate or House
floor. Even though a signature on a letter is not the same as a recorded roll call
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vote, it is felt that members who were signatories would support the V-22 in such
a situation. For this reason, the use of the letter as a surrogate for a roll call vote
did not skew the findings and any conclusions reached are regarded as valid.
2. Independent Variables
The most difficult variable to collect comprehensive data on was the
measurement of jobs at the interval level. Since this type of information is
regarded as proprietary, obtaining it was a difficult endeavor. Although only
limited surveys were returned with useful information, the data was used due to
its unique nature and possible insights it might provide.
In lieu of comprehensive interval level data on the number of direct
jobs in a senator's state or a representative's district, the simpler measure of
employment at the nominal level was used. Its weakness is that it assumes V-22
related employment for each known subcontractor. Data from the surveys showed
this not to be the case. For example, one company indicated that the value of its
V-22 subcontracted work was over $300,000 but that no one job was a direct
consequence of the work performed.
In defense of the use of the nominal level of employment, it is unlikely
that a representative will be aware of the actual number of workers at a particular
company in her or his state or district directly related to a specific program such
as the V-22. What the member is likely to know is if any V-22 work is done in
their district or state and will, in all likelihood, assume that jobs among his
constituents are linked to the continuation of the program. Armed with only this
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rudimentary information, the member will probably vote in favor of sustaining
the program if he or she is parochially motivated. For this reason, the use of
nominal level employment data is justified and should not discredit any of the
findings of this study.
One final problem encountered was obtaining the list of subcontractors
from the prime contractors. Again, any such list is usually regarded as proprietary
information and generally not available to the public. It is possible that the list
obtained from Bell Helicopter-Textron was altered to avoid the detection of any
questionable behavior on the part of the prime contractors such as strategic
placement of subcontracts in key defense committee members districts or to avoid
the appearance of "spreading the contract out" to gain the widest possible support
base in Congress.
The data does not support either of these possibilities. As shown in the
Senate, the list indicated that the subcontracts were present in 26 states. Also, the
analyses conducted and presented in Chapter V showed that membership on the
influential Senate Appropriations Committee and House Armed Services
Committee and their related germane subcommittees was a significant event. If
the list was meant to deceive or was altered to hide any questionable behavior,
the data did not support these possible suspicions.
To the contrary (and much to the benefit of the author), both of the
prime contractors were open and very helpful in obtaining information related to
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the V-22. There is no reason to believe that the list of subcontractors obtained was
anything less than genuine.
C. IMPLICATIONS
The data failed to support any of the major hypotheses related to
congressional behavior on defense issues such as the V-22. It is clear that some
other measure of personal preference is needed or that the NSI tabulation
procedures need to be revisited to account for the everyday issues of defense as
opposed to the controversial issues involving strategic systems that comprises
only a small share of the overall defense budget. Perhaps tabulations of votes on
troop levels or procurement of conventional weapons systems such as Multiple
Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) would provide a more accurate indicator of
today's defense environment.
For future studies, use of ratings systems such as the ADA or the NSI must
used with caution. Efforts to collect employment data at the interval level must
also be made if researchers hope to determine at what point a member may
"submerge his own policy preferences to those of his constituents."4
204
ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER VI
1. This comment comes from the previously cited study done by Kenneth
Mayer. See Kenneth Mayer, "The Politics and Economics of Defense
Contracting/' (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1988), p. 198.
2. That case was when Southern Democrats were excluded from the rest of the
Senate in the geo-political variation (Table 5.7).
3. Secondary V-22 specific indicators of the personal preference hypothesis —
membership in the Tiltrotor Technology Coalition (TTC) or being a former
U.S. Marine (FMR. usmc) were also used but because of their narrow focus,
they have no widespread applicability. Results of these indicators can be
found at the end of each major section in Chapter V.
4. The quote is taken from John W. Kingdon, Congressmen's Voting Decisions
(New York: Harper and Row, 1973), p. 31.
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APPENDIX A. SENATE BIVARIATE ANALYSES
TABLE A.l: 102nd SENATE
Iml Var. R2 Obs Effect Pr<rf7>ChiS<j
PR1.VNDR. 0.015647 100 0.1467
PR.DIR.J08S 0.010174 100 -0.004855 0.2697
P.PROJ.JOB5 0.012296 100 -0.0007747 0.2283
SV8.VNDR. 0.001239 100 0,6830
S.THR.JOBS 0.015229 72 -0.0206644 0.2323
fi.TKOi.tOKS 0.037574 72 -00106825 0.2978
TTl.OUL.j09S 0.017750 70 -0 0048104 0.2232
TTL.PRJ.JOBS 0.026472 70 -0.0009836 1556
TTMOBS 0.025216 70 -0 0008235 0.1631
DSMC BASE 014491 100 0.1625
AIM 0.013812 Q7 0.00842571 0.1835
NSI 0.010946 97 -0.0064041 0.2372
PARTY 0.036730 100 0.0262
TTC 1776^7 100 0.0000
PS 016669 97 -0.0153861 1448
IIOEtVG PAC 01X1096 100 00001438 0.9096
TEXTRON PAC 0.003979 100 0.00006485 0.4732
TTL PAC 0.002088 100 0.00003055 06008
FMR, VSMC 0007239 100 0.3236
SASC 0.033313 100 0.0342
SAC 0.011903 100 0.2056
OF & AD 0.006474 100 0.3506
Dl & T 0.003167 100 0.5138
PRO) 0.010391 100 0.2538
RONS 0.010391 100 2369
DEF 0.047544 100 0.0114
A-l
TABLE A.2: 102nd SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE (SASC)
l nit. Var B 1 Obs. Efltct Vrob>ChiStf
PRI.VN0R. 20
PR.DlR.iOBS -le-10 20 0*
P.rROj.jOBS -le-10 20 0'
SUB.VNOR. 0.042274 20 0.3687
S.DIR.JOBS 0.087893 12 2.66963234' 0.9749
S.PKOJ.J08S 026444 12 0.31786743' 0.9738
nU)K.JOBS 0.100515 11 2.70688112' 0.9745
TTU>KJ<JOBS 0.029888 11 0.32163031" 0.9735
TTWOBS 0.100516 11 279914278' 0.0780
OSMC BASE 0.003744 20 0.7843
ADA 0.066521 20 0.02130668 0.2819
NSI 0.08381 20 -0 0325754 0.3298
PARTY 0.092768 20 0.1730
TTC 0.051124 20 0.3117
PS 0.125918 20 -0.0515519 0.1530
BOfJNC PAC 0.000628 20 -0 0000278 0.9101
TEXTRON PAC 000023 20 0.00000461 0.9829
TTL PAC 0.000094 20 -0.0000054" 0.9654
FMR. USMC 0.051124 20 — 03117
CI & AO 0.042274 20 0.3576
D1 & T 0.023877 20 — 0.4894
PROJ 0.002514 20 — 0.8225
RDNS 002514 20 — 0.8225
unstable data zeroed data
A-2
TABLE A.3: 102nd SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE (SAC)
Ind. Var. R2 Ofos. Effect Prah>ChiSq
PRf.VNDR. 28 1 0000
PR.DIR.J08S 0.002932 28 0.00196543 0.7398
P.PROJ.JOBS 0.001112 28 0.00017322 0.8363
SV8.VNDK. 0.136879 28 — 0.0212
S.WMOBS 0.231747 19 -0.1463313 0.1680
S.PRQJ.JOB5 0.194381 19 -0.0912414* 0.2641
Tn.O*&,JOBS 0.002238 19 -0 001258 0.8096
TTUPRJ.JOBS 0.002572 19 -0.0002185 0.7962
TTL.JOBS 0.002526 19 -0.0001864 0.7980
DSMC BASE -9e-20 28 —
ADA 0.01408 28 0.00838858 0.4633
NSI 0.004783 28 -0.00413314 0.6673
PARTY 0.061054 28 1266
TVC 0.093836 28 0.0654
PS 007329 28 -0 0098382 5953
BOEING PAC 0.039961 28 -0 1X10288 0.2569
TEXTRON PAC 0.00048 28 -0 0000186 0.8916
TIL PAC 0.008696 28 -0 0000507 0.5691
PMR, VSMC 0.036669 28 0.2329





TABLE B.l: LOGIT EQUATION 2 - SENATE (JOBS,)



























































p values in parentheses
unstable data
PS collinear with NSI in Senate and among Republicans
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TABLE B.2: LOGIT EQUATION 2 - SENATE (JOBSN )



























































p values in parentheses
unstable data zeroed data biased data
PS collinear with NSI in Senate and among Republicans
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TABLE B.3: LOGIT EQUATION 3 - SENATE (JOBS,)











































































p values in parentheses
unstable data zeroed data biased data
PS collinear with NSI in Senate and among Republicans
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TABLE B.4: LOGIT EQUATION 3 - SENATE (JOBSn )













































































p values in parentheses
*
unstable data
PS collinear with NSI in Senate and among Republicans
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APPENDIX C SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
TABLE CI: LOGIT EQUATION 3 - SASC (JOBS.)
p values in parentheses
unstable data zeroed data biased data
Multicollinearity between JOBS, and FMR. USMC in SASC; rdns and CF&ad, di&t, and PROJ and
USMC base and TTL PAC among Republicans.
C-l
TABLE C.2: LOGIT EQUATION 3 - SASC (JOBSN )





























































p values in parentheses
uastable data zeroed data biased data
Multicollinearity between nsi and USMC base, fmr. usmc and CF & ad, and ttl pac and PROJ.
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APPENDIX D. SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
TABLE D.l: LOGIT EQUATION 3 - SAC (JOBS,)

















































p values in parentheses
unstable data
Multicollinearity between NSI and PS in the SAC and among SAC Republicans.
D-l
TABLE D.2: LOGIT EQUATION 3 - SAC (JOBSn )

















































p values in parentheses
unstable data
Multicollinearity between NSI and PS in the SAC and among SAC Republicans.
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APPENDIX E. SENATE REGIONAL VARIATIONS
TABLE E.l: BORDER STATES (KY, MD, MO, OK, TN, WV)


























































p values in parentheses
unstable data zeroed data
E-l
TABLE E.2: E.N. CENTRAL STATES (IL, IN, MI, OH, WI)
























































p values in parentheses
unstable data zeroed data biased data
E-2
TABLE E.3: MID-ATLANTIC STATES (DE, NJ, NY, PA)



























































R : = 1
OBS. = 9
p valuer in parentheses
unstable data zeroed data biased data
E-3
TABLE E.4: MOUNTAIN STATES (AZ, CO, ID, MT, NM, NV, UT, WY)

































































p values in parentheses
unstable data zeroed data biased data
E-4
TABLE E.5: NORTHEAST STATES (CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT)






















































p values in parentheses
unstable data
E-5
TABLE E.6: PACIFIC STATES (AK, CA, HI, OR, WA)



























































p values in parentheses
unstable data zeroed data biased data
E-6
TABLE E.7: SOUTHERN STATES (AL, AR, FL, GA, LA, MS, NC, SC, TX, VA)































































R ; = 0.262741
OBS. = 20
p values iii parentheses
unstable data
E-7
TABLE E.8: W.N. CENTRAL STATES (IA, KS, MN, ND, NE, SD)



















































R ; = 1
OBS = 11
p values in parentheses
unstable data
E-8
APPENDIX F. SENATE GEO-POLITICAL VARIATION
TABLE F.l: LOGIT EQUATION 2 - SOUTHERN DEMOCRATS (JOBS,)






























































p values in parentheses
unstable data
Multicollinearity between PS and NSI for Senate (-Southern Democrats) and among Southern
Democrats.
F-l
TABLE F.2: LOGIT EQUATION 2 - SOUTHERN DEMOCRATS (JOBSn )
































































p values in parentheses
unstable data
Multicollinearity between PS and nsi for Senate (-Southern Democrats) and among Southern
Democrats.
F-2
TABLE F.3: LOGIT EQUATION 3 - SOUTHERN DEMOCRATS (JOBS.)










































































p values in parentheses
unstable data
Mulbcollinearity between PS and NSI for Senate (-Southern Democrats) and among Southern Democrats.
F-3
TABLE F.4: LOGIT EQUATION 3 - SOUTHERN DEMOCRATS (JOBSn )












































































p values in parentheses
»
unstable data




SENATE TILTROTOR TECHNOLOGY COALITION (TTC) MEMBERS
TABLE G.l: LOGIT EQUATION 2 - SENATE TTC MEMBERS (JOBS,)
p values in parentheses
unstable data







































zeroed data biased data
Multicollinearity between TTL PAC and jobs, among Repubilcans
G-l
TABLE G.2: LOGIT EQUATION 2 - SENATE TTC MEMBERS (JOBSn )











































p values in parentheses
»
unstable data
Multicollinearity between FMR. usmc and TTL pac among Republicans
G-2
TABLE G.3: LOGIT EQUATION 3 - SENATE TTC MEMBERS (JOBS.)












































p values in parentheses
unstable data
Multicollinearity between TTL PAC and JOBSj; D & T and rdns among Republicans
G-3
TABLE G.4: LOGIT EQUATION 3 - 102ND SENATE TTC MEMBERS (JOBSn )

















































p values in parentheses
*
unstable data zeroed data biased data
Multicollinearity between FMR. USMC and TTL PAC among Republicans.
G-4
APPENDIX H. SENATE NON-TTC MEMBERS
TABLE H.l: LOGIT EQUATION 2 - SENATE NON-TTC MEMBERS (JOBS,)
























































p values in parentheses
unstable data
Multicollinearity between PS and NSI in Senate and among Republicans
H-l
TABLE H.2: LOGIT EQUATION 2 - SENATE NON-TTC MEMBERS (JOBSn )























































p values in parentheses
unstable data
Multicollinearity between PS and NSI in Senate and among Republicans
H-2
TABLE H.3: LOGIT EQUATION 3 - SENATE NON-TTC MEMBERS (JOBS,)










































































Multicollinearity between PS and NSI in Senate and among Republicans
biased data
H-3
TABLE H.4: LOGIT EQUATION 3 - SENATE NON-TTC MEMBERS (JOBSn )





































































p values in parentheses
unstable data
H-4
APPENDIX I. SAC DEFENSE SUBCOMMITTEE
TABLE 1.1: LOGIT EQUATION 1 - SENATE NON-TTC MEMBERS





























































p values in parentheses
unstable data
M
APPENDIX J. HOUSE BIVARIATE ANALYSES
TABLE J.l: 102nd HOUSE
in4. Var. R2 era*. Effect ProfoChiSq
PKI.VNOfU 0.004598 435 — 0.1573
PR.DiR.JOBS 004595 435 -0.0373313 0.8351
P.PRQJ.J08S 0.004596 435 -0.0049263 0.8435
SUB.VNDK. 0.004678 435 0.0930
S.WR.JOBS 081511 21 0.05035573 0.1558
S.PR0JJO8S 0.11184 18 0.01694953 0.3686
TTUtMR-JOBS 0.027392 ii -0.007187 0.4664
TTUPKJ.JOB5 0.037616 19 -0.0011215 0.4369
rrujoss 0.004205 333 -0 0013362 0.3236
USMC BASE 0.003332 435 0.1617
ADA 0.002631 387 0.00364863 0.2356
NSI 0.009269 384 -0.0057935 0.0270
PART* 0.008015 435 0.0892
TTC 0.195239 435 0.0000
PS 0.000016 387 -0.0004254 0.9265
BOE4NG PAC 002643 435 0.00001438 0.0003
rermoN pac 0.04903 435 -0 0006837 0.0000
TTl PAC 0.05319 435 -0 0004202 0.0000
FMR. USMC 0.02531 435 0.0001
HASC 0.043065 435 0.0000
HAC 00077 435 0.4955
PROC 0.020494 435 0.0004
R & O 0.010445 435 0.0121
SPWR 0017264 435 0.0013
RONS 020709 435 0.0004
DBF 0.006732 435 0.0439
J-l
TABLE J.2: 102
nd HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE (HASC)
tttd. Var. R* Obe. Effect f>rob>CMSq
PRl.VNtWL 0.007997 54 0,5200
PR.DlR.jOBS 0007093 54 -0.0407583' 0.^380
P.PROJ.J08S 007993 54 -0.0051627* 0.9380
SLB.VNDR, 0.109072 54 0.0175
S.DtR.JOBS 1 3 1.27360953" 0.9973
S.PROJ.JOBS 1 3 0.3640579" 0.9974
TTUOm.JOBS 126692 3 -0.0124569 0.5605
tTUPRJ.JOSS 194466 3 -0.0022093 0.5585
ra-j<»s 0.004524 44 -0.0009141" 07119
USMC BASE 000152 54 0.9293
ADA 0,053211 49 -0.0215626 0.1347
N&l 0013332 4^ 00084764 0.4348
PARTY 0.094885 54 0.0267
TTC 0246654 54 0.0004
PS 0.114625 49 0.04515711 0.0293
BOEfNC PAC 016454 54 0.00026112 0.3441
TE>TC*0N PAC 0.000243 54 0.00003446 0,9102
TTL PAC 0.006432 54 0.00009246 0.5559
FMR. D8MC 0.041759 54 01416
PRDC 0.008102 54 0.5173
R&D 0.012087 54 0.4290
BPWR 00112 54 0.4465




nd HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMOTE (HAC)
Ind. Var. R' Ote. Effect Pwb>Chi$q
PRI.VNDR. 59
PR.DIKJOBS -9e-18 59 0*
P4>KOJ.J08S -9e-18 59 0*
SLUVKDR. 0.006102 59 0.4810
VWR.JUBi 0.011307 45 -0.0677712* 04848
SJttOJ.JOBS 0.021647 44 -0.1831243' 0.0268
TTLJDllt^QBS 0.018179 4 -0.0310049 0.7853
TTL.PRJ.J08S 0.131063 4 -0.2304948* 0.9794
TTLjoas 0.029123 44 -0.066026* 0.3722
USMC BASE 0.015217 59 0.2658
ADA 0.016934 58 000906129 0.2483
N« 0.059182 58 -0.0148801 0.0342
PARTY 0.000016 59 0.9708
TTC 0.214379 59 0.0000
ii 0.010484 58 -0.0110801 0.3628
BOEING FAC 0.103489 59 -0.000758 0.0162
TEXTHON PAC 0.125831 59 -0.0010066 0.0181
TTt PAC 0.152749 59 -0.0006183 0.0105
FM*. USMC 0.046777 59 0.0511
OK 0.044726 59 0.0630
unstable data zeroed data
J-3
APPENDIX K. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
TABLE K.l: LOGIT EQUATION 2 - HOUSE (JOBS,)
p values in parentheses
unstable data
PS collinear with NSI in House and among Republicans





















































R2 = 0.250718 R2 = 0.267203 R2 = 0.278872
OBS. = 294 OBS. = 1«4 OBS. = 110
K-l
TABLE K.2: LOGIT EQUATION 2 - HOUSE (JOBSN )



























































p values in parentheses
unstable data
PS collinear with NSI in House and among Republicans
K-2
TABLE K.3: LOGIT EQUATION 3 - HOUSE (JOBS.)













































































p values in parentheses
unstable data
Ps collinear with NSI in House and among Republicans
K-3
TABLE K.4: LOGIT EQUATION 3 - HOUSE (JOBSn )













































































p values in parentheses
unstable data
Ps collinear with NSI in House and among Republicans
K-4
APPENDIX L. HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
TABLE L.1: LOGIT EQUATION 3 - HASC (JOBS,)










































































p values in parentheses
unstable data
Multicollinearity between PS and NSI in the HASC
L-l
TABLE L.2: LOGIT EQUATION 3 - HASC (JOBSn )





































































R : = 1
OBS. = 30
R ; = 1
OBS. = 19
p values in parentheses
unstable data
Multicollinearity between PS and NSI in the HASC
L-2
APPENDIX M. HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
TABLE M.l: LOGIT EQUATION 3 - HAC (JOBS,)
p values in parentheses
unstable data







































R2 = 0.594931 R2 = 0.787989
OBS. = 17OBS. = 27
M-l
TABLE M.2: LOGIT EQUATION 3 - HAC (JOBSn )



















































p values in parentheses
unstable data
Ps collinear with NSI in HAC and among Democrats
M-2
APPENDIX N. HOUSE REGIONAL VARIATIONS
TABLE N.l: BORDER STATES (KY, MD, MO, OK, TN, WV)



























R : = 0.234568
OBS. =250




























R 2 = 0.269222
OBS. = 336
R : = 0.541315
OBS. = 48
p values in parentheses unstable data zeroed data
N-l
TABLE N.2: E.N. CENTRAL STATES (IL, IN, MI, OH, WI)



























R : = 0.226378
OBS. = 257




























R : = 0.276825
OBS. = 321
R : = 0.265086
OBS. = 63
p value* in parentheses
unstable data
N-2
TABLE N.3: MID-ATLANTIC STATES (DE, NJ, NY, PA)



























R : = 0.278375
OBS. = 240




























R : = 0.303241
OBS. = 316
R : = 0.321557
OBS. = 68
p values in parentheses
unstable data
N-3
TABLE N.4: MOUNTAIN STATES (AZ, CO, ID, MT, NM, NV, UT, WY)



























R : = 0.255108
OBS. = 275
































p values in parentheses
unstable data
N-4
TABLE N.5: NORTHEAST STATES (CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT)


























R ; = 0.238595
OBS. = 284



























R : = 0.275241
OBS. = 368
R : = 0.32679
OBS. = 16
p values in parentheses
unstable data
N-5
TABLE N.6: PACIFIC STATES (AK, CA, HI, OR, WA)





























































R : - 0.255202
OBS. = 332
R : = 0.637897
OBS. = 52
p values in parentheses
unstable data
N-6
TABLE N.7: SOUTHERN STATES (AL, AR, FL, GA, LA, MS, NC, SC, TX, VA)





























R 3 = 0.300027
OBS. = 207






























R : = 0.319979
OBS. = 286
R : = 0.236961
OBS. = 98
p values in parentheses
unstable data
N-7
TABLE N.8: W.N. CENTRAL STATES (IA, KS, MN, ND, NE, SD)

























































R : - 0.270577
OBS. = 365
R : = 0.889132
OBS. = 19
p values in parentheses
unstable data
N-8
TABLE N.9: REGIONAL ANALYSIS SUMMARY (JOBS,)
•
-.-.. Variables
REGION JOBS, BASE NSI PARTY TTC TTLPAC FMR.
Border - -
EN Cent :
Mid-Atl + : ;






South - + ...
WN Cent
BASE: LSMC BASE FMR.: FMR LSMC
TABLE N.10: REGIONAL ANALYSIS SUMMARY (jOBSN )
Variables













WN Cent : ;
BASE: USMC BASE FMR.: FMR LSMC
N-9
APPENDIX O. HOUSE GEO-POLITICAL VARIATION
TABLE O.l: LOGIT EQUATION 2
HOUSE SOUTHERN DEMOCRATS (JOBS,)































































p values in parentheses
unstable data
PS collinear with nsi in House and among Southern Democrats
O-l
TABLE 0.2: LOGIT EQUATION 2
HOUSE SOUTHERN DEMOCRATS (JOBSn )






























































p values in parentheses
unstable data
PS collinear with NSI in House and among Southern Democrats
0-2
TABLE 0.3: LOGIT EQUATION 3
HOUSE SOUTHERN DEMOCRATS (JOBS,)
















































































p values in parentheses
unstable data PS collinear with NSI in House and among Southern Democrats
0-3
TABLE 0.4: LOGIT EQUATION 3
HOUSE SOUTHERN DEMOCRATS (JOBSN )
















































































p values in parentheses
unstable data PS collinear with NSI in House and among Southern Democrats
0-4
APPENDIX P. HOUSE TTC MEMBERS
TABLE P.l: LOGIT EQUATION 2 - HOUSE TTC MEMBERS (JOBS,)




















































p values in parentheses
»
unstable data
PS collinear with NSI in House and among Democrats
P-l
TABLE P.2: LOGIT EQUATION 2 - HOUSE TTC MEMBERS (JOBSn )





















































p values in parentheses
unstable data
PS collinear with nsi in House and among Democrats
P-2
TABLE P.3: LOGIT EQUATION 3 - HOUSE TTC MEMBERS (JOBS,)






































































p values in parentheses
unstable data
PS collinear with NSI in House and among Democrats
P-3
TABLE P.4: LOGIT EQUATION 3 - HOUSE TTC MEMBERS (JOBSN )






































































p values in parentheses
unstable data
PS collinear with NSI in House and among Democrats
P-4
APPENDIX Q. HOUSE NON-TTC MEMBERS
TABLE Q.l: LOGIT EQUATION 2 - HOUSE NON-TTC MEMBERS (JOBS,)


















































p values in parentheses
unstable data
PS collinear with NSI in House and among Democrats
Q-i
TABLE Q.2: LOGIT EQUATION 2 - HOUSE NON-TTC MEMBERS (JOBSn )




















































p values in parentheses
unstable data
PS collinear with NSI in House and among Democrats
Q-2
TABLE Q.3: LOGIT EQUATION 3 - HOUSE NON-TTC MEMBERS (JOBS,)


































































p values in parentheses
unstable data
PS collinear with NSI in House and among Democrats
Q-3
TABLE Q.4: LOGIT EQUATION 3 - HOUSE NON-TTC MEMBERS (JOBSn )






































































p values in parentheses
unstable data
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